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AND MIKHAIL G. KATZ
Abstract. Leibniz used the term fiction in conjunction with in-
finitesimals. What kind of fictions they were exactly is a subject
of scholarly dispute. The position of Bos and Mancosu contrasts
with that of Ishiguro and Arthur. Leibniz’s own views, expressed
in his published articles and correspondence, led Bos to distinguish
between two methods in Leibniz’s work: (A) one exploiting clas-
sical ‘exhaustion’ arguments, and (B) one exploiting inassignable
infinitesimals together with a law of continuity.
Of particular interest is evidence stemming from Leibniz’s work
Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain as well as from his
correspondence with Arnauld, Bignon, Dagincourt, Des Bosses,
and Varignon. A careful examination of the evidence leads us to
the opposite conclusion from Arthur’s.
We analyze a hitherto unnoticed objection of Rolle’s concern-
ing the lack of justification for extending axioms and operations in
geometry and analysis from the ordinary domain to that of infini-
tesimal calculus, and reactions to it by Saurin and Leibniz.
A newly released 1705 manuscript by Leibniz (Puisque des per-
sonnes. . . ) currently in the process of digitalisation, sheds light on
the nature of Leibnizian inassignable infinitesimals.
In a pair of 1695 texts Leibniz made it clear that his incompa-
rable magnitudes violate Euclid’s Definition V.4, a.k.a. the Archi-
medean property, corroborating the non-Archimedean construal of
the Leibnizian calculus.
Keywords: Archimedean property; assignable vs inassignable
quantity; Euclid’s Definition V.4; infinitesimal; law of continuity;
law of homogeneity; logical fiction; Nouveaux Essais ; pure fiction;
quantifier-assisted paraphrase; syncategorematic; transfer princi-
ple; Arnauld; Bignon; Des Bosses; Rolle; Saurin; Varignon
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J’appelle grandeurs incomparables dont l’une
multiplie´e par quelque nombre fini que ce
soit, ne sc¸auroit exceder l’autre.
–G. W. Leibniz
[C]es touts infinis, et leurs oppose´s
infiniment petits, ne sont de mise que dans le
calcul des ge´ome`tres, tout comme les racines
imaginaires de l’alge`bre. –The´ophile
1. Introduction
Figure 130 in l’Hospital’s book Analyse des infiniment petits. . . il-
lustrates his Article 163. This item concerns the application of what is
known today as l’Hoˆpital’s rule to the geometric situation of two curves
crossing at a point B on the x-axis.
1.1. Figure 130. L’Hospital’s figure places another point b near B on
the x-axis, as well as points f and g on the two curves with abscissa
(i.e., x-coordinate) equal to b; see Figure 1.1. The author argues that bf
and bg are the differentials corresponding to the two curves. He con-
cludes that the ratio of the ordinates (i.e., y-coordinates) of the two
curves equals the ratio of their differentials.
In a 27 july 1705 manuscript Puisque des personnes. . . meant to be
sent to Pierre Varignon (but sent to Jacques Lelong on 31 july 1705),
Leibniz seeks to address one of the objections raised by Michel Rolle
concerning a case where l’Hoˆpital’s rule needs to be applied twice. Here
Leibniz writes:
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Figure 1.1. L’Hospital’s Figure 130
Et ce cas des evanouissants ou naissants est si pres du
cas dont il s’agit qu’il n’en diffe`re d’aucune grandeur
assignable, comme il est manifeste dans la figure 130
du traite´ de l’Analyse des infinitesimales, ou [i.e., ou`]
la distance entre B et b est moindre qu’aucune qu’on
puisse assigner.” (Leibniz [82], 1705; emphasis added)
The passage furnishes a succinct summary of Leibniz’s take on infinites-
imals:
(1) the infinitesimal distance Bb is smaller than any assignable
magnitude;
(2) thus Bb is itself inassignable;
(3) the points B and b are specific points in an illustration from
l’Hospital’s book;
(4) thus the distance Bb is (not a sequence but) a number.
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This apparently straightforward analysis of Leibniz’s notion of infinites-
imal is resisted by a number of modern scholars. Over three centuries
after Leibniz published his first article on infinitesimal calculus in Acta
Eruditorum ([70], 1684), scholars are still debating the nature of Leib-
nizian infinitesimals. There are two main interpretations of Leibnizian
infinitesimals in the current literature: one associated with historian
Henk Bos and the other, with philosopher Hide´ Ishiguro.
1.2. Bos on two approaches. Bos writes:
Leibniz considered two different approaches to the foun-
dations of the calculus; one connected with the classical
methods of proof by ‘exhaustion’, the other in connec-
tion with a law of continuity. (Bos [27], 1974, p. 55)
Bos goes on to describe the second method as follows: “The chief source
for Leibniz’s second approach to the justification of the use of ‘fictitious’
infinitesimals in the calculus is a manuscript. . . ” [27, p. 56]. Here Bos
is referring to Leibniz’s manuscript Cum Prodiisset ([75], 1701).
Leibniz’s second approach mentioned by Bos is based on a law of
continuity, explained by examples as follows:
[I]n the case of intersecting lines, for instance, arguments
involving the intersection could be extended (by intro-
ducing an “imaginary” point of intersection and con-
sidering the angle between the lines “infinitely small”)
to the case of parallelism; also arguments about ellipses
could be extended to parabolas by introducing a focus
infinitely distant from the other, fixed, focus. [27, p. 57]
Bos grants that Leibnizian infinitesimals are fictional:
[Leibniz] had to treat the infinitesimals as ‘fictions’ which
need not correspond to actually existing quantities, but
which nevertheless can be used in the analysis of prob-
lems. ([27, pp. 54–55]; emphasis added)
1.3. Pure fictions and logical fictions. Such usable fictions could
be termed pure fictions ; see Sherry–Katz ([112], 2014) in Studia Leib-
nitiana. Bos’ position is largely endorsed by Jesseph ([52], 2015). The
question therefore is not whether Leibnizian infinitesimals are fictions,
but rather what kind of fictions: pure fictions or logical fictions; see
Section 1.7.
The matter of Appendix 2 in (Bos [27], 1974) was dealt with in Katz–
Sherry ([59], 2013, Section 11.3, pp. 606–608) and Bair et al. ([12],
2017, Section 2.7, p. 204); see also Section 3.10 here.
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For a comparison of Leibniz’s law of continuity and the transfer prin-
ciple1 of Abraham Robinson’s framework for analysis with infinitesi-
mals see Katz–Sherry ([58], 2012) as well as Section 2.7. Bos’ position
is largely endorsed by Paolo Mancosu; see Section 2.4. Marc Parmen-
tier similarly sees two separate techniques in Leibniz’s work, including
De Quadratura Arithmetica:
Sa structure binaire se manifeste e´galement dans l’oppo-
sition entre deux types de me´thodes utilisables pour
re´aliser des quadratures. Leibniz pre´sente la premie`re
comme un amendement, duˆment fonde´ et de´montre´, de
la me´thode des indivisibles.2 Quant a` l’autre me´thode,
elle est fonde´e sur les infiniment petits. L’enjeu de la
Quadratura est de`s lors d’e´tablir leur e´quivalence. (Par-
mentier [98], 2001, p. 278)
See Section 4.9 and Section 5 for more details on De Quadratura Arith-
metica.
1.4. Extensions and predicates. There is no need necessarily to
rely on the idea of extension when formalizing Leibniz’s procedures
exploiting infinitesimals. Indeed, in Edward Nelson’s approach to in-
finitesimal analysis, such entities are found in the ordinary real line.
Extensions like R →֒ ∗R (see note 16) are necessary only if one wishes
to formalize infinitesimals in the context of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory
based on the language possessing a single relation, namely the member-
ship relation ∈. If, following Nelson, one allows for a richer language
including also a unary (i.e., one-place) predicate standard (together
with axioms governing its interaction with the Zermelo–Fraenkel ax-
ioms), then infinitesimals (defined as a nonstandard numbers smaller
in absolute value than all positive standard ones) can be found within
the ordinary real line (see Section 6 and note 44 for details).
1See note 18 for a summary concerning transfer.
2When Leibniz spoke of the method of indivisibles in DQA, he sometimes had
in mind a broader method of traditional geometry originating with Archimedes,
namely the technique of exhaustion. Thus, referring to his method not exploit-
ing infinitesimals, Leibniz wrote: “Quare methodo indivisibilium quae per spatia
gradiformia seu per summas ordinatarum procedit, ut severe demonstrata licebit.”
(Parmentier’s translation: “Voila` ce qui permettra de faire de la me´thode des indi-
visibles et de l’usage des espaces gradiformes soit des sommes des ordonne´es qui en
sont l’apanage, une me´thode et un usage rigoureusement de´montre´s” [80, p. 63].)
This method differs from the “direct method” which exploits infinitesimals. See
also note 40.
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The need for a two-tier number system to account for infinitesimal
calculus was felt by philosophers of the Marburg school, Hermann Co-
hen (1842–1918) and Paul Natorp (1854–1924). They exploited the pair
intensive/extensive to describe such a number system, with infinitesi-
mals being intensive (Cohen’s student Ernst Cassirer, while nominally
endorsing the view, in practice went on to analyze other calculi, in-
stead). However, the anti-infinitesimal sentiment fueled by Cantor,
Russell, and others at the time was too powerful and the necessary
mathematical tools not yet available to enable a convincing formalisa-
tion of such ideas; see Mormann–Katz [94] for details. An important
link between the Marburg neo-Kantians and Robinson’s school is Abra-
ham Fraenkel; see Kanovei et al. ([53], 2018) for details. Felix Klein’s
take on infinitesimals was more positive than is generally known; see
Bair et al. ([13], 2017).
1.5. Infinite sets vs infinite numbers in Leibniz. Leibniz held,
following Galileo, that infinite aggregates, collections, multitudes, or
totalities (what we may refer to as sets today) lead to contradiction;
see e.g., Knobloch ([66], 2012). Thus, in a letter to Bernoulli dated
22 august 1698, Leibniz wrote:
To be sure, several years ago I have proved that the
multitude of all numbers implies a contradiction, if [it
is] taken to be a single totality.3 (Leibniz [74], 1698,
p. 535)
On the other hand, Leibniz routinely used fictional infinite (and infin-
itesimal) numbers in his work; see e.g., Section 4.1, Katz–Sherry ([58],
2012), and Bl˚asjo¨ ([23], 2017).
1.6. Physics, matter, and space. Leibniz occasionally uses the term
syncategorematic in discussing physics, as described by De Risi:
[Leibniz] endorsed the (quite non-Aristotelian) view that
bodies are infinitely divided in actu, but in a purely ‘syn-
categorematic’ way. This latter notion aimed at express-
ing the idea that there is no final element in the division
of matter (i.e. no point), even though there are more
divisions of bodily parts than can possibly be expressed
by any finite number. (De Risi [34], 2019; emphasis in
the original).
3In the original: “Sane ante multos annos demonstravi, numerum seu multitudinem
omnium numerorum contradictionem implicare, si ut unum totum sumatur.”
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This use of the term “syncategorematic infinity” refers to matter or
space, closely related to indefinite divisibility.4
1.7. Ishiguro, logical fictions, and alternating quantifiers. An
alternative to Bos’s interpretation was developed by Ishiguro in ([50],
1990, Chapter 5).5 Ishiguro argues that a term that seems to express
a Leibnizian infinitesimal does not actually designate, denote, or refer;
rather, it is a logical fiction in the sense of Russell; see e.g., (Russell
[107], 1919, p. 45). Such a reading of Leibnizian infinitesimals contrasts
with the Bos–Mancosu reading as presented in Section 1.3 in terms of
pure fictions.
The distinction between pure fiction and logical fiction does not al-
ways receive sufficient attention from Leibniz scholars. Thus, Ohad
Nachtomy provides the following summary:
Arthur argues that, due to a syncategorematic interpre-
tation of the infinitely small, by 1676 Leibniz could use
infinitesimals in calculations and avoid the mystery –
and indeed the contradictions – that their would-be ex-
istence would involve. . . Thus a continuous whole can
be treated as if it consists in an infinity of infinitesimals;
but although by such means one can represent truths,
there are not such things in reality as infinite wholes or
infinitely small parts. (Nachtomy [96], 2014; emphasis
added)
However, this passage amounts to a banal claim that in “reality” there
is no referent for Leibnizian infinitesimals, an assertion agreed to by
Bos, Mancosu, and Parmentier. As a summary of the syncategorematic
position that it purports to be, Nachtomy’s passage is a failure.
Note that Russell himself never applied his concept of logical fiction
to Leibnizian infinitesimals. According to Ishiguro,
[Leibniz] is treating [infinitely small lines] as convenient
theoretical fictions because using signs which looks [sic]
as if they stand for quantities sui generis is useful.”
(Ishiguro [50], 1990, p. 84)
Such “signs which look as if they stand for quantities” turn out to con-
ceal universal and existential quantifiers as follows. Ishiguro contends
that Leibniz’s continuum is Archimedean, as when she emphasizes “the
importance that Leibniz attached to his claim that, strictly speaking,
4See also main text at note 25.
5The interpretation in question was developed in the second, 1990 edition of Ishig-
uro’s book, and is not yet found in its first edition (Ishiguro [49], 1972).
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there are only finite numbers and magnitudes” [50, p. 99]. She clarifies
the nature of her non-designating claim in the following terms: “we
can paraphrase the proposition with a universal proposition with an
embedded existential claim” [50, p. 87]. In conclusion,
Fictions [such as Leibnizian infinitesimals] are not en-
tities to which we refer. . . . They are correlates of
ways of speaking which can be reduced to talk about
more standard kinds of entities. ([50, p. 100]; emphasis
added)
Such fictions, which are not entities to which we can refer in Ishiguro’s
view, are exemplified by Leibnizian infinitesimals:
We saw that Leibniz believed that his language of in-
finitesimals was rigorous, although there is only a syn-
categorematic infinitesimal. [50, p. 96]
1.8. Of rabbits and snakes. Ishiguro’s reading has been endorsed
by a number of Leibniz scholars. While not all of them subscribe to
her not entity view, Ishiguro’s idea that Leibnizian infinitesimals are
not to be interpreted as non-Archimedean quantities has been endorsed
by Arthur ([4], 2013, p. 554), Goldenbaum ([43], 2008, p. 76, note 59),
Gray ([45], 2015, p. 10), Levey ([91], 2015, p. 184), Nachtomy ([95],
2009 and [96], 2014), and elsewhere. Rabouin ([100], 2015, note 25,
p. 362) describes a Leibnizian infinitesimal as a “‘syncategorematic’
entity” citing Ishiguro, but points out on the same page that “this
arbitrariness [in the choice of ε] does not amount, in modern terms, to
a universal quantification (at least in classical first order logic), which
would be meaningless to Leibniz.”
Knobloch interprets Leibnizian infinitesimals as variable quantities ;
see ([61], 1990), ([62], 1994), ([64], 2002), and ([65], 2008); see also
Section 2.3.
Breger’s view of Leibniz’s infinitesimal as a process led him to a
particularly colorful metaphor:
Whoever is interested in the provability rather than in
the art of finding should not stare at the infinitely small
magnitude like a rabbit at the snake; he should take a
closer look at the process of ever-decreasing divisions.
(Breger [28], 2008, p. 188)
Breger’s claim that to understand Leibnizian infinitesimals one should
“look at the process of ever-decreasing divisions” may not be easy to
reconcile with Leibniz’s claim that one does not reach infinitesimals
by a process of ever-decreasing divisions; see e.g., Section 2.4. Breger
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goes on to offer a sharp criticism of Bos’ position in [28, pp. 196–197].
However, Breger’s criticism begs the question since it is predicated on
the logical fiction hypothesis. Namely, Breger writes:
[A]ccording to Bos there were two strategies by which
to justify Leibniz’s recourse to infinitesimals: epsilon-
tics and the principle of continuity (Bos, 1974, 55–57).
This distinction appears artificial, for the principle of
continuity is of course also founded on epsilontics: two
magnitudes are equal if their difference is smaller than
any magnitude that can possibly be expressed. . . . In
either case the processual nature is the decisive point; it
is of no great import whether the process is described by
means of epsilontics or with reference to the principle of
continuity. (Breger [28], 2008, p. 197; emphasis added).
Breger’s rabbit-and-snake metaphor contains the germs of a remarkable
admission, namely that some historians tend to become paralyzed when
faced with bona fide infinitesimals.6
1.9. Syncategorematic talk. Some of these authors claim to find
support for their view in Proposition 6 from Leibniz’s unpublished text
De Quadratura Arithmetica. Their claims have been challenged in a
recent detailed textual study by Bl˚asjo¨ ([21], 2017); see also Knobloch
([68], 2017), Bl˚asjo¨ ([22], 2017), and Section 5.
Ishiguro’s interpretation of Leibnizian infinitesimals goes under the
name syncategorematic:7
. . . talk of infinitesimals is, as [Leibniz] says, syncategore-
matic and is actually about ‘quantities that one takes. . .
as small as is necessary in order that the error should
be smaller than the given error.’ (Ishiguro [50], 1990,
p. 90; emphasis added)
6The “epsilontic” theme is continued in Breger’s 2017 article: “The fact that the
infinitely small (and the incomparably small) magnitudes derived their justification
from epsilontics was simply self-evident. Leibniz did not consider it necessary to
explain this in any depth” (Breger [29], 2017, p. 78; emphasis added). One ap-
preciates Breger’s admission that there is no in-depth source in Leibniz for the
“epsilontic” reading. See further in note 37.
7Peter Geach pointed out the inappropriateness of using the term syncategorematic
in this context: “‘Categorematic’ and ‘syncategorematic’. . . are words used to
describe (uses of) words in a language; an infinite multitude, say, can no more be
syncategorematic than it can be pronominal or adverbial. To be sure, the confusion
is explicable. . . ” (Geach [39], 1967, p. 41).
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Note that here Ishiguro applies the term not to physics, matter, or space
(see Section 1.6), but rather to an individual magnitude. Used this way,
the term is the catchword for the idea that Leibnizian infinitesimals are
“signs which look as if they stand for quantities” but in reality signify
concealed quantifiers.8 The passage Ishiguro is alluding to actually
provides a piece of evidence against her syncategorematic thesis; see
Section 3.1.
1.10. Of Leibniz and Weierstrass. Bowdlerized accounts of Leib-
niz’s position portraying him as a proto-Weierstrassian are ubiquitous
in the literature. Thus, commenting on Leibniz’s observation that “it
is unnecessary to make mathematical analysis depend on or to make
sure that there are lines in nature which are infinitely small in a rig-
orous sense in contrast to our ordinary lines, or as a result, that there
are lines infinitely greater than our ordinary ones, etc.” (Leibniz [85],
1989, pp. 542–543), editor Loemker feels compelled to declare:
If Leibniz had more clearly combined his conception of
the infinitesimal as a quantity to be taken at will as
less than any assignable quantity whatever with his own
analysis of series and his functional conception of the law
of continuity, he should have been led to the critical con-
cept of limits upon which the calculus was at last theo-
retically grounded in the nineteenth century by Weier-
strass and Cauchy.9 (Editor Loemker commenting in
[85, note 2, p. 546]; emphasis added)
The presentist view of the history of analysis as inexorably progressing
toward, and culminating, at last, in the Weierstrassian Epsilontik was
analyzed by Bair et al. ([11], 2017). See also Hacking ([46], 2014) on the
distinction between a butterfly and a Latin model for the development
of a science.
1.11. Arthur’s endorsement of syncategorematic reading. In
2013 Richard Arthur endorses Ishiguro’s reading in the following terms:
I take the position here (following Ishiguro 1990) that
the idea that Leibniz was committed to infinitesimals
as actually infinitely small entities is a misreading: his
8On this reading, they are ghosts of departed quantifiers ; cf. Bair et al. ([11], 2017).
Thus, “[i]f first-order differentials have absorbed a logical quantifier, second-order
differentials have absorbed two logical quantifiers.” (Breger [28], 2008, p. 194).
9On Cauchy see note 10.
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mature interpretation of the calculus was fully in ac-
cord with the Archimedean Axiom. Leibniz’s interpre-
tation is (to use the medieval term) syncategorematic:
Infinitesimals are fictions in the sense that the terms des-
ignating them can be treated as if they refer to entities
incomparably smaller than finite quantities, but really
stand for variable finite quantities that can be taken as
small as desired. (Arthur [4], 2013, p. 554)
Here Arthur seeks to apply the qualifier syncategorematic to a Leib-
nizian infinitesimal, rather than either multitude, matter, or space (see
Sections 1.5 and 1.6). The Ishiguro–Arthur (IA) syncategorematic the-
sis concerning Leibniz’s infinitesimals has gained wide acceptance in
the literature; see Section 1.7. For more details on (Arthur [4]) see
Section 3.8.
In 2014 Arthur endorses an allegedly non-referring nature of Leib-
nizian infinitesimals:
Just as the infinite is not an actually existing whole
made up of finite parts, so infinitesimals are not existing
parts which can be composed into a finite whole. Bor-
rowing a term from the Scholastics, Leibniz called the
infinite and the infinitely small syncategorematic terms :
like ‘it’ or ‘some’ in a meaningful sentence, they do
not in themselves refer to determinate things, but can
be used perfectly meaningfully in a specified context.
(Arthur [5], 2014, p. 81; emphasis on ‘syncategorematic
terms’ in the original; emphasis on ‘refer’ added)
In 2015 Arthur renews his endorsement in the following terms:
Ishiguro (1990). . . was one of the first to argue that
Leibniz can allow for the success of treating the infinite
and infinitely small as if they are entities (under certain
conditions), and that it is this that allows him to claim
that mathematical practice is not affected by whether
one takes them to be real or not.10 (Arthur [6], 2015,
p. 146, note 16)
Ishiguro attributes such nonentity syncategorematic as-if infinitesi-
mals to Leibniz without restricting it to any specific period of Leibniz’s
career. Arthur and Levey acknowledge the presence of infinitesimal
10Quantifiers are alluded to on the same page in the following terms: “the justifi-
cation is in terms that, after Cauchy, we would now express in terms of ε and δ”
[6, p. 146] (emphasis added). For an analysis of the error of attributing prototypes
of (ε, δ) alternating quantifier definitions to Cauchy see Bascelli et al. ([17], 2018).
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entities at least in the early Leibniz. Accordingly, they have modi-
fied Ishiguro’s position to a syncategorematic interpretation starting
as early as 1676 (see Arthur [4], 2013, p. 554), recognizing that there is
a historical development of Leibniz’s mathematical insights and ideas,
including the notion of infinitesimals.
In 2018, Arthur’s syncategorematic infinitesimal goes actual. In a
chapter entitled ‘Leibniz’s syncategorematic actual infinite,’ Arthur
writes:
[T]o say that a magnitude is actually infinitely small in
the syncategorematic sense is to say that no matter how
small a magnitude one takes, there is a smaller, but there
are no actual infinitesimals.” (Arthur [7], 2018, p. 155;
emphasis added)
So is this magnitude actual or not actual? Arthur’s desire to incor-
porate the qualifier “actual” in his title leads him to comical incoher-
ence in his discussion of magnitudes. He goes on to offer yet another
endorsement of the logical fiction hypothesis in the following terms:
“In geometry one may calculate with expressions apparently denoting
such entities, on the understanding that they are fictions, standing
for variable magnitudes that can be made arbitrarily small. . . ” (ibid.,
pp. 155–156).
A re-evaluation of Leibniz’s contribution to analysis was developed in
2012 (Katz–Sherry [58]), in 2013 (Katz–Sherry [59]), in 2014 (Bascelli
et al. [15], Sherry–Katz [112]), in 2016 (Bair et al. [16]), in 2017 (Bair et
al. [12], B laszczyk et al. ([24]), and elsewhere. In an apparent reaction
to this work, Arthur wrote in 2018:
Certain scholars of the calculus have denied that the
interpretation of infinitesimals as syncategorematic was
Leibniz’s mature view, and have seen them as fictions
in a different sense. I shall not mainly be concerned
with that line of disagreement here, reserving a detailed
critique of such views for another occasion.” (Arthur [7],
2018, p. 156; emphasis added).
Meanwhile Arthur’s 2019 texts [8], [9] do not contain the reserved cri-
tique.
An IA-style reading of Cauchy’s infinitesimal as a logical fiction has
been challenged in Borovik–Katz ([26], 2012), Bair et al. ([10], 2013),
Bascelli et al. ([15], 2014), Bair et al. ([11], 2017), Bascelli et al. ([17],
2018), and elsewhere.
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2. Mathematical fictions
We argue that the IA position to the effect that “Fictions [such as
Leibnizian infinitesimals] are not entities to which we refer. . . They
are correlates of ways of speaking which can be reduced to talk about
more standard kinds of entities” (see Section 1.7) involves equivocation
on the meaning of the term fiction.
2.1. Entities, nonentities, and referents. To the extent that we
have symbolism for mathematical concepts, we can, under suitable
conditions, refer to them; to the extent that such concepts have no
referents, we can also assert that they are “not entities to which we
refer”, provided we take note of the fact that there is no difference
here between Leibnizian infinitesimals on the one hand and e.g., un-
ending decimal strings,11 on the other. In this sense Ishiguro’s attempt
at quantifier-assisted transcription of infinitesimals amounts merely to
an attempt at long-winded paraphrase of one variety of nonentity by
another.12
We argue that already in his first publication on the calculus in
1684 and especially starting in the 1690s, Leibniz exploited fictional
infinitesimals not reducible to a quantifier paraphrase, and even made
it clear that they violate the Archimedean property (see Sections 3.2
and 3.3).
2.2. Smaller than any given quantity. Leibniz repeatedly defined
infinitesimals as being smaller than any given quantity. IA read this as
“a universal proposition with an embedded existential claim” (Ishig-
uro [50], 1990, p. 87), namely, as an assertion involving alternating
quantifiers (see Section 1.7). However, a more straightforward reading
is to interpret given quantities as being assignable and infinitesimals as
inassignable, in the terminology Leibniz used both in Cum Prodiisset
in 1701 (see Section 4.1) and in his manuscript Puisque des person-
nes. . . in 1705 (see Section 1.1).13 Sometimes Leibniz also uses the
terminology of incomparables for infinitesimals (see Section 3.9).
11These were already developed by Simon Stevin at the end of the 16th century;
see Katz–Katz ([56], 2012).
12Ishiguro uses the techniques of modern mathematics like quantifiers to develop
her reading of Leibniz, but overlooks the fact that merely referring to real numbers
as standard, as she does, does not make them any less lacking in referent than
infinitesimals, from the modern viewpoint.
13The distinction assignable vs inassignable goes back to the distinction quanta vs
non-quanta in work of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), which also inspired Galileo’s
distinction between quanta and non-quanta according to Knobloch ([63], 1999, p. 89
and [69], 2019). For details on assignable vs inassignable see Section 4.1.
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Leibniz famously denied that infinite totalities can be viewed as
wholes, but such a rejection does not necessarily extend, at least in
the mathematical realm, to infinite and infinitesimal magnitudes and
quantities, as discussed in Section 1.5.
2.3. Variable quantities from Varignon to Knobloch. Knobloch
reads Leibniz’ infinitesimals as being variable quantities:
Eventually, Leibniz adhered to ‘smaller than any given
quantity’ or infinitely small that is to a completely con-
sistent fruitful definition of infinitely small. An infin-
itely small quantity is a variable quantity and can be
described in terms of the Weierstrassian epsilon-delta
language. . . It must be a variable quantity that can
be described in the Weierstrassian ε-δ-language: smaller
than any given quantity. (Knobloch, [69], 2019, pp. 2, 7)
Knobloch’s interpretation echoes a related stance expressed by Varignon
in 1700–01, when he attempted to defend and clarify Leibniz’ infinites-
imal calculus in response to attacks by Rolle. In this section, we will
compare Knobloch’s view with Varignon’s.
Rolle subsequently engaged Joseph Saurin in an a polemic that lasted
several years. We will analyze the Rolle–Saurin exchange in Section 2.9.
For the purposes of this section, we quote the following criticism ex-
pressed by Rolle:
On reconnoˆıt d’abord que les effets des me´thodes qu’on
propose dans la nouvelle Analyse, sont toujours les meˆmes
quand on substitue des quantite´s finies a` volonte´ au lieu
des Infiniment petits dx & dy: ce qui prouve que le
succe`s, bon ou mauvais, n’est point attache´ a` l’infinie
petitesse qu’on suppose dans le Systeˆme. (Rolle [106],
1703, pp. 324–325; emphasis added)
Here Rolle speaks of arbitrary finite quantities in terms similar to
Knobloch’s (with the exception of the “Weierstrassian ǫ-δ”), the dif-
ference being that Rolle is contrasting such quantities with infinites-
imals, whereas Knobloch seeks to identify them. Rolle argued that
the new Systeˆme is superfluous since whatever it can achieve can al-
ready be achieved by what he saw as finitist algebraic techniques de-
veloped by Fermat and others; see Section 2.8. Clearly both sides in
the Rolle–Saurin exchange understood Leibnizian infinitesimals to be
characterized by a property Rolle refers to as l’infinie petitesse. To
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pursue his Weierstrassian thesis, Knobloch would be forced to postu-
late that Leibniz was misunderstood by his contemporaries on account
of his infinitesimals (Ishiguro faced a similar dilemma; see Section 4.8).
This series of exchanges was part of a flurry of debate at the Paris
Academy of Sciences between 1700 and 1705 focused on the viability of
the new Leibnizian calculus; see Blay ([25], 1986) and Mancosu ([92],
1989).
Rolle attacked the idea of infinitesimals in several ways, including
protesting that they are sometimes treated as nonzero quantities and
sometimes as absolute zeroes, and in particular that from the equation
dx+ x = x, one must conclude dx = 0; see [92].
In his defense of Leibniz’ infinitesimals against these arguments,
Varignon appealed to Newton’s Principia Mathematica as the source
of imagery and rigor, extensively quoting the Scholium to Lemma XI
in Book I. According to Varignon, Rolle had failed to understand that
infinitesimals are actually variable quantities, not fixed ones. They de-
crease continually until they reach zero, but are “considered only in
the moment of their evanescence” [92, p. 231].
Varignon states (in his correspondence with Bernoulli) that differ-
entials consist “in being infinitely small and infinitely changing until
zero, in being nothing but quantitates evanescentes, evanescentia divis-
ibilia, they will always be smaller than any arbitrary given quantity”
(Bernoulli [20], 1988, p. 357).
Varignon goes on to explain how this can always be expressed instead
with an exhaustion argument, “in the way of the ancients”:
Indeed, whatever difference can be assigned between two
magnitudes which differ only by a differential it will al-
ways be possible, on account of the continual and indefi-
nite variability of this infinitely small differential, and as
on the verge of being zero, to find a differential less than
the given difference. Which shows, in the way of the an-
cients, that notwithstanding their difference these two
quantities can be taken to be equal. (In Bernoulli [20],
1988, p. 357)
It is suggestive that Varignon had to look to Newton for an appropriate
account of infinitesimals as being changing quantities.
2.4. Leibniz’s response to Varignon. In a letter dated 28 novem-
ber 1701, Varignon asked Leibniz to make a precise statement on what
should be undestood by infinitesimal quantity. Leibniz’s letter [76]
dated 2 february 1702 contains a response to Varignon. Mancosu sum-
marizes Leibniz’s response in the following three points:
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(a) There is no need to base mathematical analysis on
metaphysical assumptions. (b) We can nonetheless ad-
mit infinitesimal quantities, if not as real, [then] as well-
founded fictitious entities, as one does in algebra with
square roots of negative numbers. Arguments for this
position depended on a form of the metaphysical prin-
ciple of continuity. Or (c) one could organize the proofs
so that the error will be always less than any assigned
error. (Mancosu [93], 1996, p. 172)
What is conspicuously absent is the Newton–Varignon definition of
infinitesimal as a variable quantity (see Section 2.3). Mancosu notes
further:
In his letter [Leibniz] merged two different foundational
approaches. The first was related to the classical meth-
ods of proof by exhaustion; the second was based on
a metaphysical principle of continuity. (ibid.; emphasis
added)
Thus, Mancosu follows Bos in seeing both A-track and B-track meth-
ods (see Section 5.1) in Leibniz. The B-track method (mentioned in
item (b) of in Mancosu’s summary) relies on what is referred to by Bos
[27, p. 55] and Katz–Sherry [59] as the law of continuity.
As Leibniz wrote in the 2 february 1702 letter to Varignon (GM, IV,
91–95), this is a heuristic law to the effect that the rules of the finite are
found to succeed in the infinite, and conversely the rules of the infinite
apply to the finite:
Yet one can say in general that though continuity is
something ideal and there is never anything in nature
with perfectly uniform parts, the real, in turn, never
ceases to be governed perfectly by the ideal and the
abstract. . . (Leibniz as translated in [85, p. 544])
Having formulated the basic distinction between the real and the ideal,
Leibniz proceeds to formulate his heuristic law:
. . . and that the rules of the finite are found to suc-
ceed in the infinite, . . . 14 And conversely the rules of
the infinite apply to the finite, as if there were infinitely
small metaphysical beings, although we have no need of
them, and the division of matter never does proceed to
infinitely small particles. (ibid.; emphasis added)
We will analyze some reactions to Leibniz’s heuristic law in Section 2.7.
14The passage omitted at this point is analyzed in Section 2.6.
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2.5. Fixe et determine´e. The pair of qualifiers fixe et determine´e
occurs in several letters in the Leibniz–Varignon exchange. The first
letter in the series is a 28 november 1701 letter from Varignon to Leib-
niz, complaining about Jean Galloys (Gallois) in the following terms:
M. l’Abbe´ Galloys. . . repand ici que vous avez declare´
n’entendre par differentielle ou Infinement [sic] petit,
qu’une grandeur a` la verite´ tres petite, mais cependant
toujours fixe et determine´e, telle qu’est la Terre par ra-
port au firmament, ou un grain de sable par raport a` la
Terre. . . (Varignon [116], 1701, p. 89)
Thus, Galloys (and Varignon following him) use the pair fixe et deter-
mine´e to refer to a specific “small” assignable magnitude.
In a 2 february 1702 response (quoted in Section 5.1), Leibniz speaks
of common incomparables which are still ordinary assignable numbers.
Leibniz describes the latter as not being fixed and determined, by which
he means that they need to be made arbitrarily small in an exhaustion-
type argument.
In a subsequent letter dated 22 march 1702 from Varignon to Bernoulli
(that reached Leibniz in april), Varignon mentions that he showed Leib-
niz’s 2 february 1702 letter to P. Gouye, and describes the latter’s “cho-
leric” reaction to a perceived change in Leibniz’s stance (GM IV 97).
Leibniz responds on 14 april 1702 as follows:
Je reconnois d’avoir dit quelque chose de plus dans ma
lettre, aussi estoit-il necessaire, car il s’agissoit d’e´claircir
le memoire, mais je ne crois pas qu’il y ait de l’opposition.
Si ce Pere [Gouye] en trouve et me la fait connoistre, je
tacheray de la lever. Au moins n’y avoit il pas la moin-
dre chose qui duˆt faire juger que j’entendois une quantite´
tres petite a` la verite´, mais tousjours fixe et determine´e.
(Leibniz [77], 1702; emphasis added)
Here Leibniz uses the pair of qualifiers fixe et determine´e in the sense
used by the opponents of the calculus (Galloys and Gouye), namely to
refer to a specific “small” assignable number. Leibniz denies that his
incomparable (as opposed to common incomparables mentioned in the
2 february 1702 letter) is such a number.
The qualifier common is similarly used in “Tentamen de motuum
coelestium causis” (Leibniz [71], 1689) in reference to the type of in-
comparables used to justify infinitesimals by means of assignable num-
bers:
I have assumed in the demonstrations incomparably small
quantities, for example the difference between two common
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quantities which is incomparable with the quantities
themselves. Such matters as these, if I am not mis-
taken, can be set forth most lucidly in what follows.
And then if someone does not want to employ infinitely
small quantities, he can take them to be as small as he
judges sufficient to be incomparable, so that they pro-
duce an error of no importance and even smaller than
any given [error]. (Leibniz as translated by Jesseph in
[51], 2008, p. 227; emphasis added)
Leibniz proceeds to give practical examples of common incomparables:
Just as the Earth is taken for a point, or the diameter
of the Earth for a line infinitely small with respect to
the heavens, so it can be demonstrated that if the sides
of an angle have a base incomparably less than them,
the comprehended angle will be incomparably less than
a rectilinear angle, and the difference between the sides
will be incomparable with the sides themselves; also, the
difference between the whole sine, the sine of the com-
plement, and the secant will be incomparable to these
differences. (ibid.)
2.6. The passage on atomism. The passage we omitted in Sec-
tion 2.4 (see note 14) reads as follows: “as if there were atoms, that is,
elements of an assignable size in nature, although there are none be-
cause matter is actually divisible without limit” (Leibniz as translated
by Loemker). Loemker’s translation of this passage is imprecise. We
reproduce the original:
comme s’il y avait des atomes (c’est a` dire des elemens
assignables de la nature), quoyqu’il n’y en ait point la
matiere estant actuellement sousdivise´e sans fin. (Leib-
niz [76], 1702, p. 93; original spelling retained)
This is the unique mention of atomes in Leibniz’s letter.
Modern readers may well be puzzled by Leibniz’s aside on atom-
ism. Granted Leibniz’s consistent opposition to atomism, what need is
there to interrupt a discussion of the principles of infinitesimal calculus
by an aside concerning physical atomism? Why does Leibniz feel a
need, specifically in an infinitesimal context, to distance himself from
atomism, a doctrine familiar to schoolchildren today?
A possible answer lies in the 17th century battles – theological and
otherwise – over the doctrines of hylomorphism, transubstantiation,
and eucharist. Atomism was thought of by the catholic hierarchy at
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the time as contrary to canon law as codified at the Council of Trent in
1551 (session 13, canon 2) and therefore heretical. The infinitely small,
via the language of indivisibles exploited by Cavalieri and others, were
thought of as closely related to atomism. Leibniz’s aside therefore may
have constituted a defensive move. For details see Fouke ([37], 1992),
Bair et al. ([14], 2018).
Amir Alexander ([1], 2015) offers a different account of the opposi-
tion to indivisibles in the 17th century. Namely, the jesuits saw Eu-
clidean mathematics as an organizing principle that helps man make
order out of chaos (and in particular defeat the reformers). They saw
indivisibles as introducing a dangerous discordant note in the other-
wise (near-)perfect harmony of Euclid, and therefore opposed them as
a subversive reform. The jesuits viewed indivisibles as actual errors
introduced into the heart of pristine geometry. Indivisibles made ge-
ometry paradoxical, unreliable, and chaotic, the very opposite of what
they believed it must be. See also Sherry ([111], 2018) and Alexander
([2], 2018). Inspite of their differences, Alexander and Sherry agree on
the following: (i) indivisibles were controversial in the 17th century;
(ii) the opposition emanated from powerful religious circles; (iii) the
opposition was a major factor in the decline of the Italian school of
geometry.15
In a similar vein, Leibniz distanced himself from the idea of material
indivisibles while discussing the fictional nature of infinitesimals in a
20 june 1702 letter to Varignon:
Entre nous je crois que Mons. de Fontenelle, qui a l’esprit
galant et beau, en a voulu railler, lorsqu’il a dit qu’il
vouloit faire des elemens metaphysiques de nostre cal-
cul. Pour dire le vray, je ne suis pas trop persuade´ moy
meˆme, qu’il faut considerer nos infinis et infiniment pe-
tits autrement que comme des choses ideales ou comme
des fictions bien fonde´es. . . . Il est que les substances
simples (c’est a` dire qui ne sont pas des estres par aggre-
gation) sont veritablement indivisibles, mais elles sont
immaterielles, et ne sont que principes d’action. (Leib-
niz [78], 1702, p. 110; emphasis added)
15The case of James Gregory is particularly instructive. Gregory studied under the
indivisibilist Stefano degli Angeli at Padua. Gregory left Padua in 1668 shortly
before degli Angeli’s religious order of the jesuats was banned by papal brief in the
same year. Gregory’s books were subsequently supressed in Italy. The same year
also marked an abrupt stop to degli Angeli’s output on indivisibles. For details see
Bascelli et al. ([18], 2018).
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Leibniz expressed similar sentiments in a 1716 letter to Dagincourt; see
Section 3.9.
2.7. Leibniz’s heuristic law: from Rolle to Robinson. Leibniz
addressed a letter to Jean-Paul Bignon in july 1705. Here Leibniz sum-
marizes some objections voiced against infinitesimal calculus by Rolle
at the Academie in the following terms:
[Ces objections] reviennent a` dire en effect qu’en ma-
niant ce nouveau Calcul des infinitesimales, on ne doit
point avoir la liberte´ d’y joindre les axiomes et opera-
tions de la Geometrie et de l’Analyse ancienne; qu’on
ne doit point substituer aequalibus aequalia, qu’on ne
doit point dire que de deux quantite´s e´gales les quarre´s
sont egaux aussi, et choses semblables; . . . (Leibniz [81],
1705, p. 838; emphasis in the original; emphasis on “ax-
iomes et operations” added)
Leibniz speaks dismissively of such objections (going as far as describ-
ing them as des chicanes [81, p. 839]). Nonetheless, Rolle’s objections
are valid. Why do the newly introduced numbers obey the same ax-
ioms and operations as those governing the ancienne geometry and
analysis? Why does the squaring operation extend as expected? We
will deal with these objections in more detail in Section 2.9.
2.8. Rolle on Descartes and Fermat. The thrust of Rolle’s critique
of infinitesimal calculus was that the latter was both unnecessary and
plagued by error. Rolle felt that infinitesimal calculus was unnecessary
because the problems it solves are solved more easily with what he
claimed were ordinary algebraic techniques already available. Rolle
was specifically referring to the work of Fermat:
Cependant M. Descartes luy-meˆme dans une autre Let-
tre a` M. Hardy explique & perfectionne la Methode de
M. de Fermat. II designe la difference des abscisses par
un segment de ligne dans la figure, & il la designe en-
core par la lettre e dans le calcul, comme l’avoit de´ja
fait M. de Fermat luy-meˆme. Outre cela il suppose une
droite qui rencontre la courbe en deux points, & qui doit
devenir Tangente lorsque la difference inde´termine´e des
abscisses est prise pour un zero absolu. Il poursuit selon
les Regles ordinaires de la Geometrie & de l’Algebre, &
selon les ide´es de l’Auteur dont il explique la Methode.
(Rolle [105], 1703, p. 2)
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Fermat actually used a capital letter E (rather than the lower-case e).
The clause “qui doit devenir Tangente lorsque la difference inde´termine´e
des abscisses est prise pour un zero absolu” is open to interpretation;
see e.g., note 28, (Katz et al. [57], 2013), (Bair et al. [14], 2018).
2.9. Rolle, Saurin, and chicanes. The issue of handling the squar-
ing operation in the extended domain, mentioned in Section 2.7, is a
subtler problem than might appear at first sight. Leibniz repeatedly
emphasizes that he is working with a generalized notion of equality “up
to” a negligible term; see e.g., Leibniz’s sentences [1] and [2] quoted in
Section 3.2. It is possible to interpret Leibniz’s comment as asserting
an equality between, say, a pair of infinitely close infinite numbers H
and H + ǫ, where ǫ is infinitesimal, e.g., ǫ = 1
H
. If so, computing the
squares of the two numbers we obtain a difference of
(H + ǫ)2 −H2 = H2 + 2Hǫ+ ǫ2 −H2 = 2Hǫ+ ǫ2 = 2 + ǫ2.
Thus, the difference between the squares in this case is an appreciable
(non-infinitesimal) amount 2+ ǫ2, and one can reasonably ask whether
Leibniz would consider the squares still equal and under what circum-
stances. The generalized equality is used, for example, in the proof of
Leibniz’s rule d(xy) = xdy+ydx which involves dropping the negligible
term dxdy. This procedure was pertinently criticized by Rolle in [106,
p. 327].16
Leibniz’s comment on squaring quoted in Section 2.7 was prompted
by the following comment by Rolle:
On y voit un second de´gagement, et une troisie´me sub-
stitution; on y quarre les deux membres de la formule S =
xdy
dx
Ce qui n’a encore este´ pratique´ dans la Ge´ometrie
transcendante, ni indique´ par aucune regle dans cette
Ge´ometrie. (Rolle [105], 1703, p. 33)
Leibniz’s comment on extending “axioms and operations” was prompted
by Rolle’s objection to what he felt was a dubious procedure that con-
sists in
16This issue can be routinely clarified in Robinson’s framework in terms of the
standard part function, in the context of the hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R. The
subring hR ⊆ ∗R consisting of the finite elements of ∗R admits a map st to R,
known as standard part. The map st : hR → R rounds off each finite hyperreal
number to its nearest real number. This enables one, for instance, to define the
derivative of t = f(s) as f ′(s) = st
(
∆t
∆s
)
(for infinitesimal ∆s 6= 0). For details see
e.g., Keisler ([60], 1986), Katz–Sherry ([58], 2012). See also notes 18 and 28.
LEIBNIZ’S WELL-FOUNDED FICTIONS AND THEIR INTERPRETATIONS 23
citer des regles ordinaires qui ayent quelque rapport
aux operations; supposer qu’elles sont particulieres a`
l’Analyse des Inf. petits. [105, p. 33–34]
Rolle’s objections were quoted by Joseph Saurin in his response; see
(Saurin [108], 1705, p. 248). It is instructive to examine Saurin’s reac-
tion to Rolle’s objections:
mais nous serions tombe´s-la`, dans une extraction de
racines, non moins inou¨ie dans toute la Geometrie tran-
scendante, que la permission que nous nous sommes
donne´e d’e´lever la formule au quarre´; tant il nous e´toit
impossible de resoudre le cas propose´ par M. Rolle, sans
faire des supple´mens a` nos de´fectueuses Me´thodes.
(Saurin [108], 1703, pp. 253–254)
Saurin’s sarcasm is palpable, but what about a response to Rolle’s
objection? Alas, none is forthcoming. Instead, sarcasm turns to ad
hominem:
Apre´s cette vaine & puerile discussion, ou` m’ont jette´ les
difficultez de M. Rolle; je suis oblige´ pour mon honneur
de de´clarer icy aux Ge´ometres que je sens toute la honte
qu’il y a a` s’arreˆter a` des objections de cette nature. Si
je le fais, c’est parce qu’elles servent a` faire connoˆıtre de
plus en plus quel est l’esprit de l’Auteur que je refute,
etc. (ibid., p. 254)
Saurin proceeds next to Rolle’s objection regarding the extension of
rules:
citer des regles ordinaires qui ayent quelque rapport aux
operations; supposer qu’elles sont particulieres a` l’Ana-
lyse des Inf. Pet. . . . Tous cela paroles jette´e en l’air,
& qui ne prouve autre chose, sinon que les manieres de
l’Auteur sont touˆjours les meˆmes. (ibid.)
Saurin was unable to appreciate Rolle’s objection but in fact, Rolle’s
objection was more poignant than those formulated three decades later
by George Berkeley (see Katz–Sherry [59], 2013). We will analyze
Rolle’s objection further in Section 2.11.
2.10. La Re´forme. As in Leibniz’s comments on atomism and indi-
visibles (see Section 2.6), religious tensions seem just below the surface
in the Rolle–Saurin exchange. Rolle appears to feel free to exploit
phrases like selon la re´forme when referring to Leibnizian calculus,
even though its practitioners never used the term to describe the new
techniques. The term re´forme occurs at least ten times in (Rolle [105]).
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Meanwhile, Saurin had converted to catholicism barely a decade ear-
lier, and would not necessarily have appreciated Rolle’s choice of ter-
minology, containing an allusion to the Reformation and the Counter-
Reformation. These were developments of a recent past at the time.
In one of his responses, Saurin alludes to Rolle’s terminology, and
asks rhetorically: where is the reform in all this? (with “reform” itali-
cized): “Y a-t-il la` quelque de´guisement, quelque supple´ment, quelque
reforme?” (Saurin [109], 1706, p. 12). And again: “D’abord on re-
marquera que cette solution a` laquelle M. Rolle s’est principalement
attache´, est non un nouveau supple´ment, une nouvelle reforme, ainsi
qu’il l’appelle, mais une solution de surcroˆıt; . . . ” (ibid.)
Rolle’s move of imputing ideologically impure motives to the pro-
infinitesimal opposition is not without modern imitators.17
2.11. Transfer. As noted in Section 2.9, Rolle was asking for a justi-
fication of Leibniz’s heuristic law allowing one to extend rules from the
ordinary domain to the extended domain of the infinitesimal calculus.
In modern terminology such justification is provided by the transfer
principle. Robinson analyzed Leibniz’s heuristic law as follows:
Leibniz did say, in one of the passages quoted above,
that what succeeds for the finite numbers succeeds also
for the infinite numbers and vice versa, and this is re-
markably close to our transfer18 of statements from R
to ∗R and in the opposite direction. (Robinson [101],
1966, p. 266)
Rolle was unwilling to accept the validity of such transfer. There is
little in the responses he received that could have satisfied him, given
his rejection of infinitesimal quantities.
Leibniz suggests that infinitesimals ought to be treated as fictitious
entities, as one does in algebra with square roots of negative numbers.
Thus the difference is not merely a distinct approach to infinitesimals
17See Section 4.3 at note 30.
18The transfer principle is a type of theorem that, depending on the context, asserts
that rules, laws or procedures valid for a certain number system, still apply (i.e., are
“transfered”) to an extended number system. Thus, the familiar extension Q →֒ R
preserves the property of being an ordered field. To give a negative example, the ex-
tension R →֒ R∪{±∞} of the real numbers to the so-called extended reals does not
preserve the property of being an ordered field. The hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R
(see note 16) preserves all first-order properties, e.g., the formula sin2 x+cos2 x = 1
which remains valid for all hyperreal x, including infinitesimal and infinite values
of x ∈ ∗R.
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from Varignon’s, but a broader difference in their stances on mathe-
matical formalism.
According to Mancosu, “by considering the infinitesimals as well-
founded fictions, [Leibniz] was introducing a gap between the formal
apparatus and the referents” (Mancosu [93], 1996, p. 173).
3. Evidence: incomparables
We argue that Leibnizian texts tend to support the interpretation of
Bos and Mancosu over that of IA.
As a general comment, note that someone seeking to contest the
IA interpretation of Leibnizian infinitesimals as logical fictions might
be tempted to assert that Leibnizian infinitesimals are not fictional
but real. Such a formulation may unwittingly entail ontological com-
mitments as to the reality of infinitesimals. However, one can reject
Ishiguro’s interpretation and still retain the fictionalist interpretation
of Leibnizian infinitesimals.
To borrow Moigno’s and Connes’ terminology, one might say that an
infinitesimal is chimerical.19 It does not however follow that they are
logical chimeras in the IA sense.
3.1. Leibniz’s syncategorematic passage. Leibniz wrote in 1702:
Cependant il ne faut point s’imaginer que la science
de l’infini est degrade´e par cette explication, & reduite
a` des fictions; car il reste toujours un infini syncate-
gorematique, comme parle l’Ecole & il demeure vray
par exemple, que 2 est autant que 1/1+1/2+1/4+1/8+
1/16+1/32+&c. Ce qui est une series infinie dans laque-
lle toutes les fractions, dont les Numerateurs sont l’unite´,
& les denominateurs de progression Geometrique dou-
ble, sont comprises a` la fois; quoy qu’on n’y employe
toujours que des nombres ordinaires, (Leibniz [76], 1702;
emphasis in the original)
Having made his remark concerning what he refers to as syncategore-
matic infinity that involves only ordinary numbers, Leibniz goes on to
conclude:
& quoy qu’on n[’]y fasse point entrer aucune fraction
infiniment petite, ou dont le denominateur soit un nom-
bre infini. (ibid.; emphasis added)
19See Schubring ([110], 2005, p. 456) and Bascelli et al. ([17], 2018, Section 4.1) on
Moigno; see Connes ([31], 2004, p. 14) and Kanovei et al. ([54], 2013, Section 8.2,
p. 287) on the views of Connes.
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The plain meaning of the passage is that an infinitely small fraction
(or a fraction whose denominator is an infinite number) is not involved
in syncategorematic infinity. Thus Leibniz takes what he refers to as
infinitely small fractions to be bona fide infinitesimals of track B type,
in the terminology of Section 5.1.
3.2. Euclid, Definition V.4, and incomparables. Leibniz repeat-
edly made it clear that his system of magnitudes involves a violation
of the Archimedean property, viz., Euclid’s Elements, Definition V.4;
see e.g., the passage in Leibniz ([73], 1695, p. 322) as quoted by Bos
([27], 1974, p. 14). This definition is a technical expression of Leib-
niz’s distinction between assignable and inassignable quantities; see
Sections 1.1 and 4.1.
The violation of V.4 appears directly to contradict the IA claim
that Leibniz was working with an Archimedean continuum. Leibniz
frequently writes that his infinitesimals are useful fictions ; but it is best
not to understand them as logical fictions but rather as pure fictions ;
see Section 1.2.
Let us consider in more detail Leibniz’s comment in his article Re-
sponsio ad nonnullas difficultates a Dn. Bernardo Niewentiit. . . on
Euclid V.5 (numbered V.4 in modern editions), which is a version of
the Archimedean axiom:20
[1] Furthermore I think that not only those things are
equal whose difference is absolutely zero, but also those
whose difference is incomparably small. [2] And al-
though this [difference] need not absolutely be called
Nothing, neither is it a quantity comparable to those
whose difference it is. [3] It is so when you add a point
of a line to another line or a line to a surface, then you do
not increase the quantity. [4] The same is when you add
to a line a certain line that is incomparably smaller. [5]
Such a construction entails no increase. [6] Now I think,
in accordance with Euclid Book V def. 5, that only those
homogeneous quantities one of which, being multiplied
by a finite number, can exceed the other, are compara-
ble. [7] And those that do not differ by such a quantity
are equal, which was accepted by Archimedes and his
20See De Risi [33], 2016, Section II.3 for more details on Euclid’s Definition V.4.
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followers.21 (translated from Leibniz [73], 1695, p. 322;
numerals [1] through [7] added)
Here Leibniz employs the term line in the sense of what we would today
call a segment. In clause [3], Leibniz exploits the classical example
with indivisibles (adding a point to a line doesn’t change its length)
so as to motivate a similar phenomenon for incomparables in clause [4]
(adding an incomparably small line to a finite line does not increase its
quantity), namely his transcendental law of homogeneity (Leibniz [83],
1710) summarized in clause [5].22
In clause [6], Leibniz refers to homogeneous quantities satisfying
Euclid’s definition V.5, i.e., the Archimedean axiom. In a follow-up
clause [7], Leibniz goes on to refer to ‘those [quantities],’ say Q and Q′,
that ‘do not differ by such a quantity,’ namely they do not differ by a
homogeneous quantity of the type mentioned in clause [6] (that would
satisfy Euclid V.5 relative to Q or Q′). Rather, Q and Q′ differ by
a quantity not satisfying Euclid V.5, i.e., a quantity which violates
V.5 relative to Q and Q′. Leibniz views such quantities as equal in
the sense of a generalized relation of equality governed by his law of
homogeneity ; see Katz–Sherry ([58], 2012).
Leibniz referred to differences as in clause [1] as incomparably small.
Thus Leibniz is clearly dealing with an incomparably small difference
Q−Q′ which violates Euclid V.5 relative to Q or Q′.
3.3. Letter to l’Hospital refutes reading by Arthur. Leibniz is
even more explicit about the fact that his incomparables violate Eu-
clid V.5 in his letter to l’Hospital dated 14/24 june 1695:
J’appelle grandeurs incomparables dont l’une multiplie´e
par quelque nombre fini que ce soit, ne sc¸auroit exceder
21In the original Latin: “[1] Caeterum aequalia esse puto, non tantum quorum
differentia est omnino nulla, sed et quorum differentia est incomparabiliter parva;
[2] et licet ea Nihil omnino dici non debeat, non tamen est quantitas comparabilis
cum ipsis, quorum est differentia. [3] Quemadmodum si lineae punctum alterius
lineae addas, vel superficiei lineam, quantitatem non auges. [4] Idem est, si lineam
quidem lineae addas, sed incomparabiliter minorem. [5] Nec ulla constructione
tale augmentum exhiberi potest. [6] Scilicet eas tantum homogeneas quantitates
comparabiles esse, cum Euclide lib. 5 defin. 5 censeo, quarum una numero, sed finito
multiplicata, alteram superare potest. [7] Et quae tali quantitate non differunt,
aequalia esse statuo, quod etiam Archimedes sumsit, aliique post ipsum omnes.”
(Leibniz [73], 1695, p. 322; numerals [1] through [7] added)
22In reference to this passage, Breger claims that “the unassignable magnitudes
are fictitious, they cannot be determined by any construction” (Breger [28], 2008,
p. 196), but fails to deal with Leibniz’s very next sentence concerning Euclid V.5
(V.4 in modern editions).
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l’autre, de la meˆme fac¸on qu’Euclide la pris dans sa cin-
quieme definition du cinquieme livre.23 (Leibniz [72],
1695, p. 288; original spelling preserved; emphasis in the
original)
In formulas, what Leibniz is saying is that magnitude ε is incomparable
with a magnitude r when the following formula is satisfied: (∀n)[nε < r]
(for finite n). Thus Leibniz makes it clear that his incomparable mag-
nitudes violate the Archimedean property (a.k.a. Euclid V.4) relative
to r. We will analyze Breger’s discussion of this passage in Section 3.4.
Arthur’s claim in [4, p. 562] based on the very passage from Re-
sponsio quoted in Section 3.2 that allegedly “Leibniz was quite explicit
about this Archimedean foundation for his differentials as ‘incompa-
rables’ ” (emphasis added) is therefore surprising. Arthur does not
provide any explanation for his claim but rather merely reproduces the
passage we analyzed in Section 3.2, goes on to cite additional passages
from Leibniz, and then gets into a discussion of Leibniz’s 1684 article
and other texts.
Arthur thus fails to explain his inference of an allegedly Archimedean
nature of the Leibnizian continuum from this passage. Therefore we can
only surmise the nature of Arthur’s inference, apparently based on the
reference to Archimedes himself in the passage quoted in Section 3.2.
However, the term Archimedean axiom for Euclid V.4 was not coined
until the 1880s (see Stolz [114], 1883), about two centuries after Leibniz.
Thus, Leibniz’s mention of Archimedes in [73] could not refer to
what is known today as the Archimedean property or axiom. Rather,
Leibniz mentions an ancient authority merely to reassure the reader of
the soundness of his methods, or alludes to the method of exhaustion.
Arthur’s cryptic claim concerning the passage mentioning Archimedes
(i.e., that it is indicative of an allegedly Archimedean foundation for
the Leibnizian differentials) is misleading and anachronistic.
Leibniz’s 1695 letter to l’Hospital (involving a violation of Euclid
Definition V.4 by Leibniz’s incomparables) is absent from Arthur’s
bibliography. We will analyze Ishiguro’s comments on the letter in
Section 3.5.
3.4. Breger on letter to l’Hospital. In Section 3.3 we presented
our analysis of the allusion to the violation of Euclid V.4 in Leibniz’s
23Translation: “I use the term incomparable magnitudes to refer to [magnitudes]
of which one multiplied by any finite number whatsoever, will be unable to exceed
the other, in the same way [adopted by] Euclid in the fifth definition of the fifth
book [of the Elements ]” (V.4 in modern editions).
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14/24 june 1695 letter to l’Hospital. Breger gives a similar interpreta-
tion of this passage:
In a letter to L’Hoˆpital of 1695, Leibniz gives an explicit
definition of incomparable magnitudes: two magnitudes
are called incomparable if the one cannot exceed the
other by means of multiplication with [sic] an arbitrary
(finite) number, and he expressly points to Definition 5
of the fifth book of Euclid quoted above. (Breger [29],
2017, p. 73–74).
Here Breger acknowledges that Leibnizian incomparable magnitudes
violate Euclid V.5 (V.4 in modern editions), i.e., that they are non-
Archimedean relative to ordinary ones. Breger’s position is especially
significant. This is because he otherwise pursues an interpretation close
to the logical fiction hypothesis (see e.g., Section 1.8), leading Arthur
to write:
When Breger says that there is no actual infinite in Leib-
niz’s mathematics, he is primarily concerned to deny the
reading of the actual infinite in Leibnizian mathematics
as categorematic (as in non-Archimedean construals of
the continuum and infinitesimals), and I have no quar-
rel with him. . . about this.” (Arthur [7], 2018, p. 157;
emphasis added)
Contrary to Arthur’s claim (and to Breger’s position expressed else-
where), Breger does not deny but rather endorses such a “non-Archi-
medean construal” in [29, pp. 73–74].
We briefly consider the possibility that what Breger might have
meant here is an interpretation of Leibnizian incomparable magnitudes
as functions or sequences tending to zero. However, such an interpre-
tation is untenable for the following reason. If a violation of V.4 is
attributable to e.g., a sequence tending to zero, then it becomes nearly
impossible for a system of magnitudes to avoid being in violation of
Euclid V.4. Namely, as soon as one incorporates magnitudes corre-
sponding to, say, the ordinary rational numbers, by density one will be
able to choose a sequence tending to zero, and thus detect a violation
of Euclid V.4 in this sense. The only systems not violating Euclid V.4
would be discrete systems like N. It seems clear that this is not the
meaning Euclid had in mind when he formulated Definition 4 of his
book V. Since Leibniz refers explicitly to Euclid it seems also clear
that such a discrete system of magnitudes is not what Leibniz had in
mind, for otherwise he would have likely mentioned such a significant
departure from Euclid’s intention.
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In other words, the ordinary system of magnitudes in Euclid is clearly
meant to obey V.4 for otherwise Euclid would not have stated V.4 as a
definition. On the other hand, it is clear that such a system cannot be
as restrictive as a discrete system like N. With regard to Leibniz, it is
particularly clear that his system of ordinary (assignable) magnitudes
necessarily incorporates arbitrarily small ones, since Leibniz believed in
indefinite divisibility of matter (see e.g., Section 2.6). Such a system of
ordinary magnitudes cannot satisfy V.4 if Definition V.4 is interpreted
in terms of sequences. Thus the interpretation of magnitudes in terms
of sequences is at tension with both Euclid’s and Leibniz’s intention.
See also end of Section 3.5.
3.5. Ishiguro on l’Hospital. The 1695 letter [72] from Leibniz to
l’Hospital responding to Nieuwentijt’s criticism is cited in Ishiguro’s
bibliography but Ishiguro erroneously describes Leibniz’s criticism of
Nieuwentijt here as criticism of. . . Leibniz’s ally, l’Hospital:
It is important to realise however that in this letter Leib-
niz is using de l’Hospital’s own criterion to refute him.
De l’Hospital had asserted both that higher differen-
tials are not magnitudes and, if after being multiplied
by an infinite number the assumed quantity does not
become an ordinary magnitude, then it is not a magni-
tude at all. It is a nothing. Leibniz responded that if
that is what de l’Hospital believes, then he cannot at
the same time claim that ddx and dxdx are not magni-
tudes, since they would, if multiplied by an infinite num-
ber (“per numerum infinitum sed altiorem seu infinites
infinitum”) become ordinary magnitudes. This is, how-
ever, not Leibniz’s own criterion, as he does not believe
that there is such a thing as an infinite number.24 He is
on the contrary trying to explain what differentials and
quadratures are by spelling out the thought that leads
to them in terms of finite quantities, finite numbers, and
Leibniz’s concept of ‘infinitely many’ and of ‘incompa-
rable.’ (He points out for example that de l’Hospital
is wrong to think that if dy is equal, dx would also be
equal.). (Ishiguro [50], 1990, p. 89)
24Ishiguro provides no sources to justify her claim that “Leibniz does not believe
that there is such a thing as an infinite number.” Nor does she pay attention to
the distinction between multitude and number; see Section 1.5.
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Ishiguro repeatedly attributes to l’Hospital what Leibniz describes as
Nieuwentijt’s errors. Nieuwentijt is not mentioned at all on Ishiguro’s
page 89.
What are we to make of Ishiguro’s command of the details of the
alignment of forces among Leibniz’s contemporaries with regard to
infinitesimal calculus? The shoddiness of her command of such de-
tails undermines the credibility of her sweeping claims to the effect
that Leibniz was allegedly misunderstood by his contemporaries like
Bernoulli and l’Hospital (see Section 4.8), particularly in view of the
fact that Leibniz specifically endorses l’Hospital’s approach; see Sec-
tion 1.1.
No scholar of ancient Greece has yet stepped forward to give a syn-
categorematic reading of Euclid’s Definition V.4. It seems reasonable
to assume that Leibniz’s understanding of Euclid’s Definition V.4 and
its negation was similar to that of modern scholars; see e.g., De Risi
([33], 2016). Therefore, to account for Leibniz’s 1695 texts analyzed in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3, advocates of the logical fiction approach would
have to extend Ishiguro’s hypothesis that Leibniz was misunderstood
by his contemporary scholars to apply to modern scholars of Euclid, as
well.
3.6. Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain. In his 2014
book, Arthur makes the following claim:
Having reached this conclusion in 1676, [Leibniz] holds
it from then on: ‘there is no infinite number, nor in-
finite line or other infinite quantity, if these are taken
to be genuine wholes.’ (NE 157) There is an actual in-
finite, but it must be understood syncategorematically,
etc. (Arthur [5], 2014, p. 88)
The same syncategorematic claim, based on the same Leibnizian pas-
sage, is reproduced four years later in (Arthur [7], 2018, p. 161). How-
ever, a careful examination of the evidence leads one to the opposite
conclusion from Arthur’s. Arthur’s reference (NE 157) is an English
translation of Leibniz’s treatise Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement
Humain. Here a fictional character named The´ophile argues as follows:
The´ophile: A proprement parler, il est vrai qu’il y a
une infinite´ de choses, c’est-a`-dire qu’il y en a toujours
plus qu’on puisse assigner. Mais il n’y a point de nom-
bre infini ni de ligne ou autre quantite´ infinie, si on les
prend pour des ve´ritables touts, comme il est aise´ de
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de´montrer. Les e´coles ont voulu ou duˆ dire cela, en ad-
mettant un infini syncate´gore´matique, comme elles par-
lent, et non pas l’infini cate´gore´matique. (Leibniz [79],
1704, p. 113)
This passage occurs in Chapter 17 (of Book II) entitled De l’Infinite´.
Arthur reproduces the first two sentences of the above passage, but fails
to report the outcome of the discussion between The´ophile and another
fictional character, Philale`the. The above preliminary comment by
The´ophile is in response to the opening comment by Philale`the:
Philale`the: 1 Une notion des plus importantes est
celle du fini et de l’infini, qui sont regarde´es comme
des modes de la quantite´. (ibid.)
A disagreement soon emerges between the two characters. While Phi-
lale`the views the finite and infinite as “des modifications de l’e´tendue
et de la dure´e,” The´ophile insists that “la conside´ration du fini et infini
a lieu partout ou` il y a de la grandeur et de la multitude.” On the latter
view, the infinite is an attribute of magnitude and multitude. It is not
not an attribute of extension (i.e., continuum or space) and time, as
Philale`the argues. When Philale`the again attempts to connect the in-
finite to space, The´ophile provides a detailed rebuttal,25 and concludes
as follows:
Mais on se trompe en voulant s’imaginer un espace ab-
solu qui soit un tout infini compose´ de parties, il n’y
a rien de tel, c’est une notion qui implique contradic-
tion, et ces touts infinis, et leurs oppose´s infiniment pe-
tits, ne sont de mise que dans le calcul des ge´ome`tres,
tout comme les racines imaginaires de l’alge`bre. (Leib-
niz [79], 1704, p. 114; emphasis added)
Thus according to The´ophile, in space, bona fide infinitesimals are im-
possible; but in the calculations of geometers, they do have a place.
The´ophile’s suggestion that infinitesimals are possible in calculation
on par with imaginary numbers is cogent; see also Section 4.6. Arthur
fails to reproduce this crucial passage, which constitutes a piece of
evidence against the IA logical fiction hypothesis, since there does not
exist a syncategorematic paraphrase of imaginary numbers as such log-
ical fictions. Thus the very chapter 17 of Nouveaux Essais from which
Arthur quotes in support of the IA thesis actually furnishes evidence
against it.
25This connects with Leibniz’s syncategorematic views of physical space, as men-
tioned by de Risi; see Section 1.6.
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3.7. Arnauld–Leibniz exchange. In ([6], 2015), Arthur equivocates
on the exact meaning of the syncategorematic claim with regard to its
implications for Leibniz’s infinities and infinitesimals, but whether or
not his reading is identical to Ishiguro’s, Arthur does not seek to dif-
ferentiate his reading from Ishiguro’s and on the contrary repeatedly
endorses Ishiguro’s logical fiction reading; see Section 1.11. No less an
authority than Knobloch read the text (Arthur [6], 2015) as creating
an impression that the syncategorematic reading of Leibniz’s mathe-
matical infinitesimals finds support in the Arnauld–Leibniz exchange in
1687. Thus, in his review of Arthur’s text [6] for MathSciNet, Knobloch
notes that
[Richard] Arthur essentially bases his [syncategorematic]
deductions on Leibniz’s correspondence with [Antoine]
Arnauld and [Burchard] de Volder. (Knobloch [67], 2015)
What exactly is the basis, allegedly deriving from such correspondence,
for the IA thesis? Arnauld being more influential than de Volder, we
will focus on the Arnauld–Leibniz exchange. Arthur cites the following
passage from Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld:
I believe that where there are only beings by aggrega-
tion, there will not in fact be any real beings; for any
being by aggregation presupposes beings endowed with a
true unity, because it derives its reality only from that of
its constituents. It will therefore have no reality at all if
each constituent being is still a being by aggregation, for
whose reality we have to find some further basis, which
in the same way, if we have to go on searching for it, we
will never find.26 (Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 april 1687 as
translated in [6, p. 152])
The reader may well wonder what, if anything, this has to do with
mathematical infinitesimals. Indeed, the context of exchange between
Arnauld and Leibniz was the latter’s views as detailed in his “Discourse
on Metaphysics” dating from 1686. Arnauld addressed a letter to Leib-
niz on 4 march 1687, and Leibniz replied on 30 april 1687. Arnauld and
26In the original: “[J]e croy que la`, ou` il n’y a que des estres par aggregation, il
n’y aura pas meˆme des estres reels; car tout estre par aggregation suppose des
estres doue´s d’une veritable unite´, parcequ’il ne tient sa realite´ que de celle de
ceux dont il est compose´, de sorte qu’il n’en aura point du tout, si chaque estre
dont il est compose´ est encor un estre par aggregation, ou il faut encor chercher un
autre fondement de sa realite´, qui de cette maniere s’il faut tousjours continuer de
chercher ne se peut trouver jamais” (Leibniz [90], pp. 91–92).
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Leibniz are discussing the metaphysics related to the structure of mat-
ter, rather than anything related to mathematical infinitesimals, as is
evident from Leibniz’s very next sentence:
J’accorde, Monsieur, que dans toute la nature corporelle
il n’y a que des machines (qui souvent sont anime´es)
mais je n’accorde pas qu’il n’y ait que des aggrege´s de
substances, et s’il y a des aggrege´s des substances, il faut
bien qu’il y ait aussi des veritables substances dont tous
les aggrege´s resultent.’ [90, p. 92]
Thus, the Arnauld–Leibniz exchange is not concerned with the nature
of mathematical infinitesimals, contrary to Arthur’s claim as reported
by Knobloch. Leibniz’s position on mathematical infinitesimals is well
known: it is not necessary to make mathematical analysis dependent
upon metaphysical controversies (cf. Section 1.10):
“my intention was to point out that it is unnecessary
to make mathematical analysis depend on metaphysi-
cal controversies or to make sure that there are lines
in nature which are infinitely small in a rigorous sense
in comparison with our ordinary lines. . . ” (Leibniz as
translated in [50, p. 86]; emphasis added)
Seeking an explanation of the nature of infinitesimals in Leibniz’s com-
ments on the substantial status of being of aggregates of material
things, as Arthur attempted to do, is sheer obfuscation.
3.8. Leibniz and Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis. Peckhaus men-
tions that Arthur compares Leibnizian infinitesimals with nilpotent in-
finitesimals of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis (SIA; see e.g., Bell [19]):
In Section 3 Leibniz’s conception is compared with. . .
Bell’s Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis (SIA) . . . which
has many points in common with the Leibnizian ap-
proach. (Peckhaus [99], 2013).
In fact the original title of Arthur’s text was “Leibniz’s syncategore-
matic infinitesimals, Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis, and Newton’s Pro-
position 6.”27 Peckhaus notes moreover that Arthur finds many points
in common as well as dissimilarities:
The author comes to the conclusion that despite many
points in common, Leibniz’s syncategorematic approach
to the infinitesimals and Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis
“are by no means equivalent”. (ibid.)
27A preprint of Arthur’s article with this longer title can be viewed at http://u.
math.biu.ac.il/~katzmik/arthur08.pdf
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Note that SIA depends crucially on a category-theoretic foundational
framework and on intuitionistic logic to enable nilpotency. While we
welcome such a display of foundational pluralism on Arthur’s part, we
also agree with both John L. Bell and Arthur that SIA is closer to
Nieuwentijt’s approach to calculus than to Leibniz’s.
Note that the nilpotent infinitesimals of SIA are smaller in abso-
lute value than 1
n
, signifying non-Archimedean behavior. The follow-
ing question therefore arises. Why does Arthur’s voluminous output
on Leibnizian calculus systematically eschew readings related to Robin-
son’s framework and Nelson’s foundational approach (see Section 1.4),
based as they are on classical set-theoretic foundations and classical
logic, and enabling straightforward transcription of both Leibniz’s as-
signable/inassignable dichotomy and his infinitely many orders of in-
finitesimal and infinite numbers? The question was essentially posed
five years ago in the Erkenntnis article [59] and still awaits clarifica-
tion. Meanwhile, Arthur appears to avoid Robinsonian infinitesimals
as zealously as Leibniz avoided atoms and material indivisibles; see
Section 2.6.
3.9. Leibniz, Hilbert, and Formalism. The driving force behind
the IA interpretation of Leibnizian infinitesimals seems to be a desire
to deny them an ontological reality that would smack of Platonism or
mathematical realism. Leibniz himself was clear on the matter:
Quand [nos ami] dispute`rent en France avec l’Abbe´ Gal-
lois [i.e., Galloys], le Pe`re Gouge [i.e., Gouye] & d’autres,
je leur te´moignai, que je ne croyois point qu’il y euˆt
des grandeurs ve´ritablement infinies ni ve´ritablement
infinite´simales, que ce n’e´toient que des fictions, mais
de fictions utiles pour abre´ger & pour parler universelle-
ment, comme les racines imiginaires dans l’Alge`bre, telles
que 2
√
(−1) . . . (Leibniz [84], 1716)
Without choosing sides in the realist/antirealist debate, we note that
Leibnizian infinitesimals can be understood as fictions in a sense close
to the school of Formalism as developed in the 20th century mathemat-
ics by David Hilbert (see e.g., Hilbert [48], 1926, p. 165) and others.
Thus, Abraham Robinson as a formalist distanced himself from pla-
tonist and foundationalist views in the following terms:
[M]athematical theories which, allegedly, deal with in-
finite totalities do not have any detailed . . . reference.
(Robinson [103], 1975, p. 42)
36 J. BAIR, P. B LASZCZYK, R. ELY, P. HEINIG, AND M. KATZ
Robinson explicitly linked the approaches of Leibniz and Hilbert in
the following terms: “Leibniz’s approach is akin to Hilbert’s original
formalism, for Leibniz, like Hilbert, regarded infinitary entities as ideal,
or fictitious, additions to concrete Mathematics” (Robinson [102], 1967,
pp. 39–40).
3.10. A Robinson–Go¨del exchange. Bos comments as follows on
the connection between the frameworks of Leibniz and Robinson:
The creation o¡f non-standard analysis makes it neces-
sary, according to Robinson, to supplement and redraw
the historical picture of the development of analysis . . .
it is understandable that for mathematicians who be-
lieve that [the] present-day standards [of mathematical
rigor] are final, nonstandard analysis answers positively
the question whether, after all, Leibniz was right. How-
ever, I do not think that being “right” in this sense is
an important aspect of the appraisal of mathematical
theories of the past. (Bos [27], 1974, p. 82; emphasis
added)
This criticism of Robinson by Bos is predicated on the assumption
that Robinson believed that the present-day standards of mathematical
rigor are “final.” However, the attribution to Robinson of such naive
realist views concerning the finality of this or that piece of mathematics
is unsourced and unjustified, as we argue in this section based on the
Robinson–Go¨del correspondence.
In a 23 august 1973 letter to Kurt Go¨del, Robinson refers to his
posthumously published paper ([103], 1975, presented at Bristol in
1973) on progress in the philosophy of mathematics. In this paper,
Robinson expresses formalist views. The paper was enclosed with the
23 august 1973 letter to Go¨del. Robinson’s letter is a follow-up on dis-
cussions that took place between him and Go¨del during Robinson’s
visit to the Institute for Advanced Study (15–18 august 1973).
In the letter Robinson writes: “I am distressed to think that you
consider my emphasis on the model theoretic aspect of Non Standard
Analysis wrongheaded” and goes on to describe himself as a “good for-
malist”. Robinson then expresses the sentiment that Go¨del is “bound
to disagree” with the paper, possibly due to Go¨del’s realist views; see
Go¨del ([42], 2003; particularly the introduction by M. Machover) and
Dauben ([32], 1995, pp. 268–269).
Without getting into a discussion of the nature and extent of Goedel’s
realist views, what we wish to highlight is the inaccuracy of attributing
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such views to Robinson. In his formalist views Robinson was close to
both Leibniz and Hilbert.
4. Evidence: inassignables
4.1. Inassignable dx and assignable (d)x. In addition to ratios of
inassignable differentials such as dy
dx
, Leibniz also considered ratios of
ordinary values which he denoted (d)y and (d)x, so that (d)y
(d)x
would
be what we call today the derivative. Here dx and (d)x are distinct
entities since Leibniz describes them as respectively inassignable and
assignable in Cum Prodiisset [75]:
[A]lthough we may be content with the assignable quan-
tities (d)y, (d)v, (d)z, (d)x, etc., . . . yet it is plain
from what I have said that, at least in our minds, the
unassignables [inassignables in the original Latin] dx
and dy may be substituted for them by a method of
supposition even in the case when they are evanescent;
. . . (Leibniz as translated in Child [30], 1920, p. 153)
Leibniz used similar terminology in his manuscript Puisque des person-
nes . . . ([82], 1705); see Section 1.1. In Leibniz ([73], 1695), one similarly
finds:
. . . Nous voyons par la` que nous pouvons faire comme si
le calcul diffe´rentiel ne concernait que des quantite´s or-
dinaires, meˆme s’il faut en rechercher l’origine dans les
inassignables pour rendre compte des termes qui sont
e´limine´s ou se de´truisent. (Leibniz as translated by Par-
mentier in [85], 1989, p. 336; emphasis added).
Meanwhile, on the IA reading, dx and (d)x should be identical, both
denoting ordinary assignable values (perhaps equipped with a hidden
quantifier or placed in a sequence). The distinction between differen-
tials dx and (d)x, extensively commented upon by Bos ([27], 1974), is
an indication that Leibniz exploits differentials as pure fictions.
This is particularly significant since in Cum Prodiisset Leibniz is
actually doing calculus (thus, he proves the product law for differentia-
tion – Leibniz’s rule – relying on the transcendental law of homogeneity;
see Katz–Sherry [58], 2012), rather than merely speculating about it.
Breger wrote:
It has often been noted that Leibniz’s verbal descrip-
tions of infinitesimal magnitudes vary or even appear
incoherent . . . But in his use of them Leibniz is in
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fact being quite clear and explicit ; his view of infinites-
imals appears not to have altered since the beginning
of his Hannover period or a few years later. It is not
sufficient to study Leibniz’s verbal descriptions of in-
finitesimal magnitudes in isolation; they need to be in-
terpreted in connection with their mathematical usage.
(Breger [28], 2008, p. 185) (emphases added)
We disagree with Breger’s claim of alleged incoherence of Leibniz’s ver-
bal descriptions, but we agree concerning the need to focus on mathe-
matical usage.
T
A
B
(B)
C
D (C)
Figure 4.1. Leibniz’s tangent line TC(C)
4.2. Characteristic triangle. For example, consider Leibniz’s anal-
ysis, recently translated in [89], of the inassignable characteristic tri-
angle CD(C), where D is vertex of the right angle whereas C and (C)
are the other two vertices; see Figure 4.1. This characteristic triangle
is taken to be similar to the assignable triangle TBC. Leibniz writes:
[G]raˆce a` ce triangle inassignable, c’est-a`-dire a` l’interven-
tion de la raison entre quantite´s inassignables CD et
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(C)D (que notre calcul diffe´rentiel donne au moyen des
quantite´s ordinaires ou assignables), on peut trouver la
raison entre les quantite´s assignables TB et BC, et donc
tracer la tangente TC. (Leibniz [89], 2018, p. 155; em-
phasis added)
Leibniz’s tangent line TC is thought of as passing through both infin-
itely close points C and (C).28 In the same text, Leibniz sees incom-
parables as equivalent to inassignables:
[O]n voit en optique, quand les divers rayons provien-
nent d’un meˆme point, et que ce point est place´ a` l’infini
ou de fac¸on inassignable (ou encore, comme j’ai coutume
de dire souvent, “est e´loigne´ de fac¸on incomparable”),
que les rayons sont paralle`les. (ibid.; emphasis added)
Both involve a violation of Euclid’s V.4; see Section 3.5.
4.3. Differentials according to Breger and Spalt. Breger writes:
I would now like to turn briefly to Leibniz’s first pub-
lication of his infinitesimal calculus from 1684. It has
been said that Leibniz introduced infinitesimals here as
finite magnitudes (Boyer, 1959, 210; Bos, 1974, 19, 62–
64). This is not wrong, but it is misleading. Leibniz in
fact explains that one can choose any dx you like, and
he then defines dy as the magnitude that has the same
relation to dx as the ordinate to the subtangent. (Breger
[28], 2008, p. 188; emphasis added)
Breger’s comments are misleading because they misrepresent Bos’s po-
sition. The first of the pages 62–64 in Bos’s article mentioned by
Breger is page 62. On this page, Bos is analyzing Cum Prodiisset ([75],
1701), rather than Leibniz’s 1684 article [70] mentioned in Breger’s
passage. Here Bos insists on the difference between the Leibnizian dif-
ferentials dx and (d)x, where the former is inassignable whereas the
latter is an ordinary assignable quantity. In the passage quoted above,
Breger clearly has (d)x in mind, but uses the notation dx. Significantly,
Breger fails to mention anything here about this crucial distinction.
28To provide a modern interpretation, one can normalize the equation of the
line TC(C) as ax + by = c where a2 + b2 = 1. Then one can apply the standard
part function (see note 16) to the coefficients of the equation of the line TC(C) to
obtain the equation aox + boy = co of the true tangent line, where ro = st(r) for
each r = a, b, c. In this sense, the line TC(C) and the true tangent line coincide up
to negligible terms. Leibniz often points out that he is working with a generalized
notion of equality. It the case of the characteristic triangle, such a notion is applied
to secant lines and tangent lines.
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Elsewhere, Breger acknowledges a violation of Euclid V.4 in Leibniz;
see Section 3.4.
Similarly to Breger, Spalt overlooks the implications of the crucial
Leibnizian distinction between dx (inassignable) and (d)x (assignable)
in his discussion of Leibnizian differentials when he writes:
Leibniz gives a rigorous geometric justification of his
rules for differentials, and, in so doing, to a signifi-
cant extent he builds on his law of continuity. Obvi-
ously, Leibniz’s differential calculus has nothing what-
soever to do with a use of infinitely-small non-variable
‘numbers’, as are known in the modern theory of non-
standard analysis. Leibniz’ differentials aren’t ‘num-
bers’, but (variable) geometrical ‘continuous’ ‘magni-
tudes’. (Spalt [113], 2015, p. 121; translation ours)
Spalt raises the issue of the differentials being geometric magnitudes
rather than numbers. This may be an interesting issue to explore. How-
ever, this issue is transverse to the question of the non-Archimedean
nature of incomparable magnitudes. Leibniz made it clear in a letter to
l’Hospital that such magnitudes are non-Archimedean; see Sections 3.3
and 3.4.
Spalt does mention the Leibnizian differentials (d)x in a separate
discussion, where he claims that “The variable length dx with limit 0 is
called ‘infinitely small’” (Spalt [113], 2015, p. 118). However, thinking
of the Leibnizian dx as a variable with limit 0 is merely another version
of the logical fiction hypothesis.
Spalt goes on to castigate Bos for concluding that
Leibniz had proposed ‘two distinct’ (Bos 1974, p. 55)
respectively, two ‘very distinct’ (Bos 1980, p. 70) con-
cepts of differentials.” (ibid.)
Bos’ position was outlined in Section 1.2. Spalt continues:
Advocates of nonstandard analysis routinely refuse to
acknowledge this; the allures of Leibniz’ reputation, and
of the beautiful field of activity ‘historiography of anal-
ysis’, are too irresistible.29 (ibid.)
Spalt’s move of attributing questionable ideological motives to the pro-
infinitesimal opposition is not without historical precedent.30
29In the original: “Fu¨rsprecher der Nichtstandard-Analysis pflegen sich dieser Ein-
sicht zu verschließen: Die Verlockungen des Leibniz’schen Renommees sowie des
scho¨nen Beta¨tigungsfeldes “Geschichtsschreibung der Analysis” sind zu unwider-
stehlich” (Spalt [113], 2015, p. 121).
30See e.g., Section 2.10 on Rolle and la re´forme.
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4.4. Infinitesimals and contradictions according to Rabouin.
Rabouin’s argument for a version of the logical fiction hypothesis runs
as follows:
It should then be clear why infinitesimals were called by
Leibniz “fictions”. [1] In and of itself, there is no such
thing as a “quantity smaller than any other quantity”.
[2] This would amount to the existence of a minimal
quantity [3] and one can show that a minimal quantity
implies contradiction [4] (as a simple consequence of
Archimedes axiom). [5] So “infinitesimals” as “infinitely
small quantities” are terms without reference. They
only have a contextual meaning and should be para-
phrased not by terms, but by sentences in which only
finite quantities occur. (Rabouin [100], 2015, pp. 362–
363; numerals [1] through [5] added; emphasis added)
Now it is correct to assert that there is no quantity smaller than any
other quantity, as per Rabouin’s sentence [1]. However, this was not
Leibniz’s characterisation of infinitesimals. Rather, an infinitesimal is
inassignable and is smaller than every assignable quantity (see e.g.,
Sections 1.1 and 4.1). This does not imply the existence of a minimal
quantity, contrary to Rabouin’s [2]. Thus the “contradiction” posited
by Rabouin in [3] is not there. The reference to the “Archimedes
axiom” in [4] is gratuitous; this axiom is not required to obtain a
contradiction starting from Rabouin’s incorrect hypotheses. Thus, his
conclusion [5] rests on shaky premises.
4.5. Irrationals, imaginaries, infinitesimals. Leibniz employed the
qualifier “impossible” in reference to irrational numbers:
Des irrationnels naissent les quantite´s impossibles ou
imaginaires, dont la nature est e´trange, mais dont l’utilite´
ne doit pourtant pas eˆtre me´prise´e. En effet, meˆme
si celles-ci signifient en soi quelque chose d’impossible,
cependant, non seulement elles montrent la source de
l’impossibilite´, ainsi que la fac¸on dont la question pour-
rait eˆtre corrige´e afin de ne pas eˆtre impossible, mais
aussi on peut, par leur intervention, exprimer des quan-
tite´s re´elles. (Leibniz [89], 2018, p. 152; emphasis in the
original)
Leibniz goes on to discuss a few examples, and concludes:
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Ces expressions ont ceci de merveilleux que dans le cal-
cul elles ne recouvrent rien d’absurde ou de contradic-
toire et ne peuvent cependant eˆtre montre´es dans la
nature , c’est-a`-dire dans les choses concre`tes. (Leibniz
[89], 2018, p. 153; emphasis added)
Leibniz states clearly that such expressions entail no contradiction. On
the other hand, in “nature” there is no referent for such expressions;
cf. Bos on infinitesimals as summarized in Section 1.3. Similarly with
regard to imaginaries,
les valeurs des quantite´s re´elles doivent parfois ne´cessaire-
ment eˆtre exprime´es par l’intervention des quantite´s imag-
inaires et que de la` naissent des formules non moins
utiles a` toute l’e´tendue de l’analyse que ne le sont les
formules communes. Et ces quantite´s, je les appelle im-
possibles en apparence, car a` la ve´rite´ elles sont re´elles,
et je rapporte les pre´ceptes par lesquels ceci peut eˆtre
reconnu. [89, pp. 107–108]
Thus both irrationals and imaginaries are only apparently impossible,
according to Leibniz. Leibniz takes the argument a step further and
makes it clear that such notions imply no contradiction:
Il y a une grande diffe´rence entre les quantite´s imag-
inaires, ou impossibles par accident, et celles qui sont
absolument impossibles [parce qu’elles] impliquent con-
tradiction. [89, p. 108]
Leibniz has made it clear that imaginaries (as opposed to absolutely
impossible quantities) in fact do not imply a contradiction. Finally,
Leibniz extends the argument to the infinitely large and small:
De fait, les imaginaires ou impossibles par accident, qui
ne peuvent eˆtre exhibe´es parce que fait de´faut ce qui
est ne´cessaire et suffisant pour que se produise une in-
tersection, peuvent eˆtre compare´es avec les Quantite´s
infinies et infiniment petites, qui naissent de la meˆme
fac¸on. (ibid.)
Thus according to Leibniz irrationals, imaginaries, and infinitesimals
imply no contradiction; see also Sections 4.2 and 4.6. In modern termi-
nology, they are only impossible in the sense of representing new types
of mathematical entities.
4.6. Apparent impossibility as possibility. Leibniz illustrates the
apparent impossibility of imaginaries discussed in Section 4.5 via an
analysis of a geometric configuration involving a circle, say C and a
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line, say L (see [89], p. 153). If the nearest distance from L to the
center of C is greater than than the radius of C, then C and L are
disjoint. The usual formulas for points in the intersection C ∩ L then
contain imaginary terms (in modern language, the intersection points
will appear once the curves C and L are complexified). Leibniz closes
the discussion somewhat inconclusively, by commenting that to create
real intersection points, one needs to change the data of the problem
by either increasing the radius of C or moving L closer to the center
of C ([89], p. 154).
Leibniz’s comment does not solve the problem of accounting for the
use of imaginaries in a situation where one can’t change the data of
the problem. Leibniz’s comment does not help in situations where one
is forced to make sense of imaginaries and cannot avoid them. Such
a situation arises e.g., in the solution of the cubic when imaginaries
necessarily arise in an intermediate stage of the calculation, a technique
Leibniz was proficient at; see e.g., Sherry–Katz ([112], 2014, p. 169).31
Thus Leibniz’s discussion of imaginaries in the text translated in [89]
(unlike other texts) is incomplete (perhaps it was completed in subse-
quent manuscripts), and amounts to walking away from the problem
of the status of imaginaries rather than resolving it.
Leibniz’s C ∩ L example is therefore not comparable to his example
of the characteristic triangle ([89], p. 154–155) discussed above, where
Leibniz does not walk away from the problem but rather presents a
successful solution for finding the tangent line, without changing the
data of the problem. The solution is in terms of infinitesimals. Neither
example is meant to imply that imaginaries and/or infinitesimals are
either absolutely impossible or contradictory; on the contrary. There
are many problems treated by Leibniz where both imaginaries and
infinitesimals appear in solutions.
Our analysis undermines Rabouin’s claim to the effect that
Le paralle`le avec les imaginaires est tre`s souvent men-
tionne´ par ceux qui de´fendent une vue des infinite´simaux
comme entite´s ide´ales qu’on adjoindrait au domaine des
objets re´els pour la re´solution de proble`me. Or il est
frappant que dans notre texte comme dans [3b], les
imaginaires soient en fait pre´sente´s comme indiquant
que le proble`me n’a pas de solution. Si Leibniz pre´cise
que les infiniment petits et les points a` l’infini entrent
31Here Leibniz is quoted to the effect that “For this is the remarkable thing, that,
as calculation shows, such an imaginary quantity is only observed to enter those
cubic equations that have no imaginary root, all their roots being real or possible.”
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dans des proble`mes qui, eux, ont des solutions, on se
gardera ne´anmoins de forcer un paralle`le que Leibniz
ne place pas la` ou` l’interpre´tation formaliste le place.
(Rabouin in [89], 2018, p. 95, note 2 carrying over to
bottom of page 96)
Contrary to Rabouin’s claim, the parallel between imaginaries and in-
finitesimals as noncontradictory new types of entities is valid and is not
undermined by Leibniz’s C ∩L example, as we discussed in the current
section.
Leibniz repeatedly likens infinitesimals to imaginaries (see also Sec-
tions 3.6 and 3.9), and at least once described the latter as having their
fundamentum in re (basis in fact; see Leibniz [72], 1695, p. 93), provid-
ing evidence against the IA reading that would surely deny them such
a basis.
4.7. Hierarchical structure. Further support for the reading by Bos
is provided by the hierarchical structure on the Leibnizian differen-
tials dx’s, dx2’s, ddx’s, etc., ubiquitous in Leibniz’s texts. One can re-
place dx by a sequence of finite values ǫn and furnish a concealed quan-
tifier incorporated into a modern limit notion so as to interpret dx as
shorthand for the sequence (ǫn). However, one notices that limn→∞ ǫn =
0, as well as limn→∞ ǫ
2
n = 0, and also unsurprisingly limn→∞(ǫn+ ǫ
2
n) =
0. Thus, the Leibnizian substitution
dx+ dx2 = dx (4.1)
in accordance with his transcendental law of homogeneity (see Leib-
niz [83], 1710 and also Katz–Sherry [59], 2013) becomes a meaningless
tautology 0 + 0 = 0. Furthermore, if such identities are to be inter-
preted in terms of taking limits, then an absurd equality dx = dx2
would also be true. To interpret Leibniz’s substitution (4.1) in both a
syncategorematic and a meaningful manner, IA would have to intro-
duce additional ad hoc proto-Weierstrassian devices with no shadow of
a hint in the original Leibniz.
4.8. “Historically unforgivable sin”. Ishiguro mentions “Leibniz’s
followers like Johann Bernoulli, de l’Hospital, or Euler, who were all
brilliant mathematicians rather than philosophers,” (Ishiguro [50], 1990,
pp. 79–80) but then goes on to yank Leibniz right out of his historical
context by claiming that their modus operandi
is prima facie a strange thing to ascribe to someone who,
like Leibniz, was obsessed with general methodological
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issues, and with the logical analysis of all statements and
the well-foundedness of all explanations. (ibid., p. 80)
Having thus abstracted Leibniz from his late 17th–early 18th century
context, Ishiguro proceeds to insert him in a late 19th century Weier-
strassian one.32 On purely mathematical grounds, such a paraphrase is
certainly possible.33 However, such an approach to a historical figure
would apparently not escape Unguru’s censure:
It is . . . a historically unforgiveable sin . . . to assume
wrongly that mathematical equivalence is tantamount
to historical equivalence. (Unguru [115], 1976, p. 783)
Ishiguro seems to have been aware of the problem and at the end of
her Chapter 5 she tries again to explain “why I believe that Leibniz’s
views on the contextual definition of infinitesimals is [sic] different from
those of other mathematicians of his own time who sought for oper-
ationist definitions for certain mathematical notions” (Ishiguro [50],
1990, p. 99), but with limited success. Ishiguro’s dubious command of
the positions of Leibniz’s contemporaries was discussed in Section 3.5.
4.9. Leibniz against exhaustion. Parmentier quotes Leibniz’s De
Quadratura Arithmetica as follows:
J’ai dit jusqu’ici des infinis et des infiniment petits des
choses qui paraˆıtront obscures a` certains, comme paraˆıt
obscure toute chose nouvelle; rien cependant que cha-
cun ne puisse aise´ment comprendre en y consacrant un
peu de re´flexion pour, l’ayant compris, en avouer la
fe´condite´. Peu importe que de telles quantite´s soient
ou non naturelles, on peut se contenter de les introduire
par le biais d’une fiction dans la mesure ou` elles offrent
bien des commodite´s [in the Latin original: compendia,
32One of the first occurrences of a modern definition of continuity in the style of the
Epsilontik can be found in Schwarz’s summaries of 1861 lectures by Weierstrass; see
Dugac ([35], 1973, p. 64), Yushkevich ([117], 1986, pp. 74–75). This definition is a
verbal form of a definition featuring a correct quantifier order (involving alternations
of quantifiers).
33Thus, Robinson noted: “the method of ultrapowers provides a ready means for
translating a non-standard proof into a standard mathematical proof in each par-
ticular case. However, in the course of doing so we may complicate the proof
considerably, so that frequently the resulting procedure will be less desirable from
a heuristic point of view. At the same time there may well exist a shorter mathe-
matical proof which can be obtained independently” (Robinson [101], 1966, p. 19).
For a more detailed analysis see Henson–Keisler ([47], 1986).
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meaning “abbreviations” or “shorthand”] dans les for-
mulations, dans la pense´e, et finalement dans l’invention
aussi bien que dans la de´monstration, en rendant inutiles
l’usage des figures inscrites et circonscrites, les raison-
nements par l’absurde et la de´monstration qu’une erreur
est plus petite que toute erreur assignable. (Leibniz as
translated in [98, p. 284])
Leibniz’s last sentence asserts that infinitesimals make it unnecessary to
get involved in exhaustion-type proofs involving inscribed and circum-
scribed polygons, arguments with error smaller than any assignable
error, etc. This would be Leibniz’ own refutation of Ishiguro’s the-
sis. Namely, Ishiguro claimed that infinitesimals stand for exhaustion
proofs, based on the following passage from Leibniz:
these incomparable magnitudes - are not at all fixed or
determined but can he taken to be as small as we wish
in our geometrical reasoning and so have the effect of
the infinitely small in the rigorous sense. If any oppo-
nent tries to contradict this proposition, it follows from
our calculus that the error will be less than any possible
assignable error since it is in our power to make this in-
comparably small magnitude small enough for this pur-
pose inasmuch as we can always take a magnitude as
small as we wish. (Leibniz as translated in [50, p. 87])
However, Leibniz wrote that, on the contrary, infinitesimals make it
unnecessary to get involved in exhaustion proofs.34
4.10. Leibniz, Des Bosses, and Infinity. Ishiguro quotes a passage
from Leibniz’s letter to Des Bosses dated 3 march 1706, where Leibniz
writes:
Meanwhile I have shown that these expressions are of
great use for the abbreviation of thought and thus for
discovery as they cannot lead to error, since it is suf-
ficient to substitute for the infinitely small, as small a
thing as one may wish, so that the error may be less
34Note that Ishiguro’s sentence “If magnitudes are incomparable, they can be nei-
ther bigger nor smaller” [50, p. 88] involves an equivocation on the term incompa-
rable: if incomparable is taken to mean the definition from the theory of partially
ordered sets, then this is a tautology (roughly “if magnitudes cannot be compared,
then they cannot be compared”); if incomparable is taken to mean “any positive-
integer multiple is still less than any positive real” then Ishiguro’s statement is
mathematically incorrect, for the hyperreals are a totally ordered field, hence every
element can be compared with any other.
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than any given amount, hence it follows that there can
be no error. (Leibniz as translated in [50, p. 85])
Ishiguro concludes: “It seems then that throughout his working life as a
mathematician Leibniz did not think of founding the calculus in terms
of a special kind of small magnitude” [50, p. 86] (emphasis added).
But the plain meaning of the Leibnizian passage is that there are two
distinct methods, one involving infinitesimals and one involving errors
“less than any given amount,” the former being advantageous over the
latter.
Even more significantly, Ishiguro fails to mention that a few months
later, on 1 september 1706, Leibniz wrote another letter to Des Bosses
that sheds light on the question of mathematical infinity. In this letter,
Leibniz responds to a list of propositions banned by soon-to-become
General Michelangelo Tamburini in 1705. The list was sent to Leib-
niz confidentially by jesuit Des Bosses. The fourth of these banned
propositions is the following:
4. Our minds, to the extent that they are finite, cannot
know anything certain about the infinite; consequently,
we should never make it the object of our discussions.
(translation from Ariew et al. [3], 1998, p. 258)
Leibniz comments as follows:
Unless I am mistaken, mathematicians have already re-
futed the fourth proposition, and I myself have pub-
lished some samples of the science of the infinite. How-
ever, I maintain, strictly speaking, that an infinite com-
posed from parts is neither one nor a whole, and it is
not conceived as a quantity except through a fiction of
the mind. (Leibniz as translated in [88], 2007, p. 53)
Here Leibniz affirms that human mind can indeed conceive of infinity
(contrary to proposition 4 rejected by both the jesuits and himself),
and moreover that he published “samples of the science of the infinite”
to prove this. Here clearly mathematical infinity is not a mere sign for
hidden quantifiers, contrary to Ishiguro’s position.
The preponderance of the evidence in the primary sources indicates
that Leibniz did indeed found his calculus on a special kind of fictional
small magnitude.
5. De Quadratura Arithmetica
Leibniz’s unpublished text De Quadratura Arithmetica. . . (DQA) was
written shortly after he developed the infinitesimal calculus in 1675.
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Thus the work dates from an early period of his mathematical career.
Here Leibniz wrote:
Nec refert an tales quantitates sint in rerum natura, suf-
ficit enim fictione introduci, cum loquendi cogitandique,
ac proinde inveniendi pariter ac demonstrandi compen-
dia praebeant, ne semper inscriptis vel circumscriptis
uti. . . necesse sit.35 (Leibniz [87], p. 69)
5.1. B-track reading. A straightforward interpretation of this pas-
sage from DQA is that there exist two approaches to the calculus:
(A) one involving inscribed and circumscribed figures, called the
method of exhaustion; and
(B) a method involving what he referred to elsewhere as useful fic-
tions, and enabling abbreviations of speech and thought when
compared to method A.
The theme of a pair of distinct approaches occurs often in Leibniz’s
writing. Thus, in his 2 february 1702 letter to Varignon, Leibniz writes:
Et c’est pour cet effect que j’ay donne´ un jour des lemmes
des incomparables dans les Actes de Leipzic, qu’on peut
entendre comme on vent36 [sic], soit des infinis a` la
rigueur, soit des grandeurs seulement, qui n’entrent point
en ligne de compte les unes au prix des autres. Mais il
faut considerer en meˆme temps, que ces incomparables
communs meˆmes n’estant nullement fixes ou determine´s,
et pouvant estre pris aussi petits qu’on veut dans nos
raisonnemens Geometriques, font l’effect des infiniment
petits rigoureux. . . (Leibniz [76], 1702, p. 92; emphasis
added)
The passage is analyzed in its context in Section 2.5.
5.2. A-track reading. An alternative interpretation following Ishig-
uro of this type of passage in Leibniz is that the B-method is merely
shorthand for the A-method involving hidden quantifiers, in the spirit
35Jesseph’s translation: “ ‘Nor does it matter whether there are such quantities
in nature, for it suffices that they are introduced as fictions, since they allow the
abbreviations of speech and thought in the discovery as well as demonstration’
(Leibniz 1993, p. 69)” (Jesseph [52], 2015, p. 198). A longer passage including this
one was quoted in Parmentier’s French translation in Section 4.9.
36I.e., “veux”.
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of Russell’s logical fictions. Such an interpretation of the passage seems
more forced than the one we gave above.37
In DQA Leibniz wrote that infinitely small (say, ǫ) means smaller
than any given quantity, and that infinitely large means larger than
any given quantity.
Such descriptions similarly admit two readings: (A) for every given
positive quantity there is an ǫ > 0 smaller than it; or (B) this spe-
cific ǫ is smaller than every given (i.e., assignable) positive quantity.
In reading (B) the ǫ is inassignable. The dichotomy of assignable vs
inassignable quantity (or magnitude) was used frequently by Leibniz,
e.g., in Cum Prodiisset [75] and Puisque des personnes. . . [82]38
Leibniz’s reference to Archimedes in various texts typically is a ref-
erence to the method of exhaustion, and is sometimes accompanied by
a claim that infinitesimals violate Euclid Definition V.4 (see e.g., Sec-
tion 3.3). The latter is called today the Archimedean property (but
was not in Leibniz’s time).
The term syncategorematic itself is incidental to the true issues in-
volved. The real issue is whether Leibniz was relying on hidden quan-
tifiers (as per IA) or not.
5.3. Bl˚asjo¨–Knobloch differences over DQA. Knobloch wrote in
reference to DQA:
In this treatise, Leibniz laid the rigorous foundation of
the theory of infinitely small and infinite quantities or, in
other words, of the theory of quantified indivisibles. In
modern terms Leibniz introduced ‘Riemannian sums’39
in order to demonstrate the integrability of continuous
functions. (Knobloch [64], 2002, p. 59)
Knobloch then proceeds to describe Leibniz’s method, and notes:
37Based on the second sentence of the Leibnizian passage quoted in Section 5.1,
Breger claims that “[Leibniz] stresses that the incomparably small magnitudes are
certainly not ‘fixes ou determine´s’; they can be chosen as small as one wants”
(Breger [29], 2017, p. 77). However, Breger fails to mention the fact that the
first setence of the passage we quoted makes it clear that Leibniz’s comments on
incomparables not being “fixes ou determine´s” apply to common incomparables of
track A, rather than the “infinies a` la rigueur” of track B.
38See also note 13 and Section 4.1 on the dichotomy assignable vs inassignable.
39The correct technical term for this concept is Riemann sum. The adjective Rie-
mannian is also used in a technical sense, but in other contexts; e.g., Riemannian
geometry.
50 J. BAIR, P. B LASZCZYK, R. ELY, P. HEINIG, AND M. KATZ
While the “common method of indivisibles”40 consid-
ered inscriptions and circumscriptions of mixtilinear fig-
ures, the step figure is neither an inscription nor a cir-
cumscription, rather something in between. In modern
terms: Leibniz demonstrated the integrability of a huge
class of functions by means of Riemannian sums which
depend on intermediate values of the partial integration
intervals. (ibid., p. 63)
Thus, Knobloch argues that Leibniz’s technique in DQA represented
an advance over earlier inscription and circumscription techniques.
Jesseph argues in [52] that the techniques in DQA were limited by
their reliance on the knowledge of the tangent lines to the curve (and/or
the corresponding differential). Therefore the applicability of the tech-
niques depended on the availability of such data.41 Accordingly, the
solution of the quadrature problem in DQA depends on a differentia-
tion problem.
Bl˚asjo¨ analyzes Leibniz’s technique in DQA as follows. The so-called
general integration theorem in DQA assumes the existence of tangent
lines, not only of the “general function” one starts with, say f(x), but
also for a secondary function, say d(x) (following the notation in Bl˚asjo¨
[21], 2017), is constructed from f(x) by means of the tangents to f(x).
The theorem relates the areas under f and d to each other in a man-
ner closely related to modern integration by parts. The assumption
that f(x) has tangents everywhere (or possibly almost everywhere) is
essential since otherwise there wouldn’t even be any function d(x) to
investigate. The assumption that d(x) has a tangent everywhere is
less essential. The knowledge of the tangents themselves does not play
an essential role in the proof, but it is essential that the curve has no
“reversion points”, which is a notion that Leibniz has not defined other-
wise than in terms of tangents (and hence assumed that tangents must
exist, for a non-differentiable curve could reverse directions without
having a tangent corresponding to the turning point). This concerns
the general condition under which the theorem is valid. Was Leibniz
explicating precise and rigorous conditions of validity? Clearly he was
not. The conditions he does state are of an intuitive nature and are
not intended as rigorous conditions of validity. For the latter purpose,
40See note 2.
41Thus, Leibniz applies his method in DQA to find the quadrature of general cy-
cloidal segments (Edwards [36], 1979, p. 251). Here the calculation exploits the
geometric knowledge related to the construction of the curve.
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they are clearly insufficient, for example because of the issue of the tan-
gents. Leibniz’s result does not provide any general integration theory,
and is actually a single specific integration technique, closely related to
integration by parts. Just as the modern integration by parts formula,
it can be considered to apply in great generality, but it is only use-
ful in cases where we have some geometric information equivalent to
the derivatives or antiderivatives involved (otherwise it is just an exer-
cise in expressing some unknown integral in terms of another unknown
integral). For more details see Bl˚asjo¨ ([21], 2017).
Our thesis in the present text is independent of resolving these dif-
ferences among scholars concerning DQA. Namely, the contention that
Leibniz’s infinitesimal was inassignable in the sense of violating the
Archimedean property when compared to ordinary (assignable) quan-
tities is independent of the Bl˚asjo¨–Knobloch differences over DQA.
Whatever the foundational significance of DQA may have been (and
this is the subject of their disagreement), the fact remains that here
Leibniz talks about two separate methods: track A and track B. Leib-
niz seeks to justify the direct track-B method (exploiting inassignable
infinitesimals) in terms of an exhaustion-type track-A method.
5.4. Logarithmic curve. Leibniz also investigated the special case
of the logarithmic curve in Proposition 46 in DQA. In the statement
of Proposition 46, Leibniz speaks of information that can be obtained
from the hyperbola in terms of which the logarithmic curve was defined.
Thus the investigation depends on the knowledge that log(x) is the
area under 1
x
(in other words, the knowledge of the derivative of the
logarithm). This can be easily understood in the context of integration
by parts. Therefore Leibniz’s propostion on the logarithmic curve is not
an example of performing quadratures without knowledge of derivatives
or tangents.
5.5. Manuscript remained unpublished. Leibniz never published
the DQA.42 Was that because he realized that the A-method, while
not contradicting the B-method, was an impediment to the Ars Inve-
niendi? Jesseph notes in [52, p. 200] that Leibniz may have set aside
the DQA without publishing it because he had turned his attention to
more powerful methods that he would introduce in the 1680s in what
he called “our new calculus of differences and sums, which involves the
42The loss of a manuscript version in transit from Paris to Hannover in 1679,
signaled by Knobloch [68, p. 282], could have been overcome by writing a new
version, Leibniz having been only 33 at the time.
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consideration of the infinite”, and “extends beyond what the imagina-
tion can attain”43 (GM V, 307).
6. Conclusion
Leibniz did not merely use an infinitesimal approach as an unrigorous
way of doing calculus that makes the work easier. Rather, what we are
arguing is that historically there have been two separate approaches to
the calculus: track (A) and track (B). The historical calculus has often
been criticized from an anachronistic modern set-theoretic viewpoint
that would make both approaches appear unrigorous to the extent that
they did not possess a set-theoretic justification which is considered a
sine-qua-non of rigor in today’s mathematics. From such an anachro-
nistic standpoint, both historical approaches were unrigorous by today’s
standards.
The work of Fermat, Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, Cauchy and others
created a body of procedures called infinitesimal calculus and/or anal-
ysis, in what could be referred to as the pioneering phase of the dis-
cipline. Following the pioneering phase, efforts were made to develop
set-theoretic justification for this body of procedures. Eventually this
effort succeeded both for track (A) and track (B). Assigning names is
a matter of debate but in a sense Edward Nelson’s syntactic approach
([97], 1977) is particularly fundamental because it shows that one can
take an infinitesimal to be a primitive notion within the context of
the ordinary real line, in the spirit of what natural philosophers since
at least Pascal have envisioned. Nelson’s approach exploits a unary
(i.e., one-place) predicate standard; the formula standard(x) reads
“x is standard”. Thus, mathematical entities can be either standard
or nonstandard. This applies in particular to real numbers. The stan-
dard/nonstandard distinction can be seen as a formalisation of Leib-
niz’s assignable/inassignable distinction.44 For details on the systems
developed by Nelson, Hrbacek, Kanovei, and others see Fletcher et
al. ([38], 2017).
43The full sentence in the original reads: “Ainsi il ne faut point s’e´tonner, si notre
nouveau calcul des diffe´rences et des sommes, qui enveloppe la conside´ration de
l’infini et s’e´loigne par conse´quent de ce que l’imagination peut atteindre, n’est pas
venu d’abord a` sa perfection.” See Gerhardt’s edition ([41], vol. V, p. 307). The
passage appears in Leibniz’s article “Considerations sur la diffe´rence qu’il y a entre
l’analyse ordinaire et le nouveau calcul des transcendantes” in Journal des Sc¸avans
in 1694.
44In Nelson’s approach, the violation of the Archimedean property takes the
form (∃ε > 0)(∀stn ∈ N)
[
ε < 1
n
]
, where ∀st is universal quantification over stan-
dard elements only.
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Ishiguro and Arthur have argued that what appears to be a B-track
method is in reality a Russellian illusion that is eliminable by careful
analysis of the pioneering texts of Leibniz. This is the meaning of their
logical fiction hypothesis; Arthur goes so far as to speak, in the title of
his forthcoming chapter ([8], 2019), of “Archimedean infinitesimals,” a
word string that would appear as a freshman quantifier-order error to
many a mathematically educated scholar. We hold the IA hypothesis
to be an error of interpretation and have argued that it is not backed
by solid textual evidence in Leibniz.
Leibniz, by arguing in favor of exploiting inassignable infinitesimals
even though they are fictions, differed from l’Hopital and Bernoulli who
were prepared to assign a loftier ontological status to infinitesimals as
truly existing entities. In this Leibniz was remarkably modern, and
anticipated formalist strategies that fully emerged in the 20th century.
As C. H. Edwards, Jr. points out,
It is important to note that the differentials dx are fixed
non-zero quantities; they are neither variables approach-
ing zero nor ones that are intended to eventually ap-
proach zero. [36, p. 261]
Many mathematicians, historians, and philosophers nowadays are in
favor of pluralism as far as foundations of mathematics are concerned.
Today we have both A-type and B-type set-theoretic foundations, as
well as category-theoretic foundations both of classical and intuitionis-
tic types. The historical studies currently available suggest that in the
case of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus, A-type foundations are insuf-
ficiently expressive to capture the spirit of Leibniz’s work. Pluralism is
a good thing in principle but the A-type logical fiction interpretation
is not a viable alternative to the B-type pure fictional one.
The logical fiction reading of Leibnizian infinitesimals has become
entrenched to an extent that some Leibniz scholars feel compelled to
endorse it publicly, while in private correspondence conceding that
Leibniz used a dual strategy which we have elaborated in terms of a
distinction between Leibnizian methods (A) and (B) (see Section 5.1),
the latter involving pure fictional infinitesimals, as opposed to the IA
logical fiction hypothesis. The Ishiguro–Arthur hypothesis must be
rejected as having little basis in Leibniz’s writings.
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